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I. INTRODUCTION
This is Part I of a two-part paper on the 2012 National 
Administrative Law Judiciary Foundation (NALJF) Fellowship 
Topic.  The topic is, “A survey of final decision authority among 
central panel states with interpretative analysis and policy 
implications.”1
The first part of the paper will explore, analyze, and critique 
the arguments for and against final decision authority for central 
panel administrative law judges (ALJ).2 It will also articulate well-
documented concerns regarding the conflicting interests posed by 
having the heads of agencies serve as both primary litigants and final 
*This paper is dedicated to my friend and mentor, the late John W. 
Hardwicke, the first Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Maryland Office 
of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and one of the pioneers of central panel 
adjudication.  
1 2012 Fellowship Competition, NAALJ NEWS (Nat’l Ass’n of Admin. 
Law Judiciary, Des Moines, Iowa), Jan. 2012, at 10. I presented a very preliminary 
preview of this paper to the 2012 National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary (NAALJ) annual conference in New Orleans.  In addition, Julian Mann 
(Director and Chief ALJ, North Carolina OAH) and I moderated a related panel 
discussion of the topic.  The panel consisted of Robert S. Cohen, Chief ALJ, 
Florida Department of Administrative Hearings; Thomas E. Dewberry, Chief ALJ, 
Maryland OAH; Jeff S. Masin, Deputy Chief ALJ, New Jersey Office of 
Administrative Law; Ann Wise, Director, Louisiana Office of Administrative Law; 
Tom Stovall, Chief ALJ of the Administrative Procedures Division, Tennessee 
Secretary of State; Raymond R. Krause, Chief ALJ, Minnesota OAH; Gregory L. 
Ogden, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University (who was the reporter for the 
Drafting Committee of the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act); and 
Ann Marshall Young, Administrative Judge, United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission.
2 The term “administrative law judge” (ALJ) is generally used in this 
paper to refer to all administrative adjudication presiding officers—although some 
jurisdictions may use different terminology such as “hearing officer,” “hearing 
examiner,” “referee,” or some other term.  The federal government distinguishes 
between ALJs and administrative judges (AJs) presiding in administrative hearings 
based on whether the person is an ALJ appointed through the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedure Act (federal 
APA) or an AJ appointed outside the federal APA procedure.  This distinction in 
title has no application in state administrative law.  Unless otherwise stated or 
required by the context, the use of the title “ALJ” in this paper is not a reference to 
how (or pursuant to what statute) the ALJ was appointed.
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decision-makers over cases adjudicated by central panel ALJs.  
Arguments will be based upon the author’s own two decades of 
experience working as an ALJ in Texas—as well as working with 
ALJs and state agency heads in his other roles at state agencies—and 
on a review of key literature, case law, and commentary on the 
subject.  Part I of the paper will conclude with a discussion of several 
law review articles on final decision authority for central panel ALJs 
published in national law journals—two articles each by Professors 
James F. Flanagan and Jim Rossi, and an article by Professor James
E. Moliterno. 3 All articles support retention of final decision 
authority in the agency head.4
The second part of this paper will appear in a future issue of 
this journal.  It will contain a detailed discussion of the debate and 
controversy surrounding the Uniform Law Commission’s 5 (ULC) 
decision not to include final decision authority for central panel ALJs 
as an option for adoption by state legislators in the 2010 Model State 
3 See James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative 
Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and 
Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355 (2002) [hereinafter 
Flanagan, Redefining the Role]; James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in 
Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401 (2005) 
[hereinafter Flanagan, An Update]; Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: 
Balancing Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 1 (1999) [hereinafter Rossi, Final Orders on Appeal]; Jim Rossi, Final, 
but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53 
(2004) [hereinafter Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible]; James E. Moliterno, The 
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191 
(2006).
4 Id.  There have also been law review articles and essays supporting the 
transfer of final decision authority from the agencies to central panel ALJs.  These 
are discussed infra at note 184 and accompanying text.
5 The ULC was formerly named the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).  See State Administrative 
Procedure Act, Revised Model Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=State%20Administrative%20
Procedure%20Act,%20Revised%20Model (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (regarding 
the 2010 MSAPA).  The 2010 MSAPA was the fourth MSAPA recommended by 
this organization.  See id. The organization recommended earlier MSAPAs in 
1946, 1961, and 1981.  Id. Most jurisdictions have a variation of the 1961 
MSAPA.  In the discussion that follows, the organization will be referred to by the 
name it was using in the period under discussion, but the reader should understand 
that NCCUSL and the ULC are the same organization.
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Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA).  Although the subject of 
final decision authority continued to be debated, the full commission 
adopted the ULC’s draft in the plenary session.6
A brief review of the events will provide some context for the 
subject of this paper.  The debate concerning whether or not to 
provide a specific section for optional final decision authority for 
central panel ALJs led to organized opposition to the 2010 MSAPA 
from three national ALJ groups—the Central Panel Directors 
Conference (CPDC), the National Association of Administrative Law 
Judiciary (NAALJ), and the American Bar Association (ABA) 
National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary (NCALJ).7
At the outset of the process of drafting the 2010 MSAPA, the 1997 
ABA Model Act for Creation of a Central Hearing Agency (1997 
ABA Model Act) was used as a model for drafting sections 
pertaining to central panels.8 The 1997 ABA Model Act contained a 
provision specifically allowing the state legislature “the option to 
delegate final decision making authority to central panels.” 9 The 
ALJ organizations viewed the deletion of that provision from the 
2010 MSAPA as a step backward.10 I had the opportunity to serve as 
an ABA section advisor to the drafting committee of the 2010 
MSAPA (along with several other ALJs), so I am very familiar with 
the drafting committee proceedings.11
6 Id.
7 See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2–3 (2011), 
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/house_of_deleg
ates/112_2011_my.authcheckdam.pdf.
8 See id. at 3.
9 See id. 
10 See id.
11 The other ALJ ABA Section Advisors to the drafting committee were 
Edward J. Schoenbaum, retired ALJ, Illinois Department of Employment Security 
of Springfield, Illinois, representing the ABA’s Administrative Law and 
Regulatory Practices Section; Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Senior ALJ in the Colorado 
Office of Administrative Courts, and Adjunct Professor at Sturm College of Law in 
Denver, Colorado, representing the ABA’s Government and Public Sector Lawyers 
Division; and Julian Mann III, Director and Chief ALJ, North Carolina OAH, 
representing the ABA’s National Conference of ALJs.  I served as an advisor to the 
drafting committee on behalf of the ABA’s Judicial Division.  In addition, 
Professor Asimow, who appointed the original advisors for the ABA’s 
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In addition to a discussion of the debate surrounding the 
central panel-related provisions of the 2010 MSAPA, the second part 
of this paper will include up-to-date survey information from all 
central panel jurisdictions regarding: (1) the size of the panel, its 
historical development, and the scope of its current jurisdiction; (2) 
the extent, if any, to which it now has final decision authority; (3) the 
source of that authority, whether legislative, through court order, or 
by voluntary transfer from line agencies; (4) the extent, if any, to 
which final decision authority has been an issue in each jurisdiction; 
and (5) related matters.  I invite input from readers of the first part of 
the paper as to related matters that the survey should cover.
Because the journal publishing this article has an ALJ 
orientation, most readers are likely familiar with central panels.  
However, a brief definition will provide clarity and context for 
purposes of review.  Most succinctly, a central panel is an agency of 
ALJs established to conduct administrative adjudications for other 
agencies. 12 The central panel’s main role is to provide fair 
adjudications and due process to both the litigating agencies and the 
public.13 The central panel ALJ is independent of, and not subject to 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practices Section, lists Ann Marshall Young, 
AJ of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and former Tennessee Central Panel 
ALJ, as one of its advisors to the drafting committee (although her name has been 
omitted from the published list of advisors).  See Michael Asimow, Contested 
Issues in Contested Cases: Adjudication Under the 2010 Model State 
Administrative Procedure Act, 20 WIDENER L. J. 707, 707 (2011).
12 “A central panel system of administrative law judges (ALJs) is one in 
which a central office of administrative hearing employs a staff of ALJs and 
assigns them, on the request of administrative agencies, to preside over agency 
proceedings.”  See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, The Central Panel System: A 
Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE
236, 236 (1981) (footnote omitted).  Another formal definition of the term “central 
panel” is contained in the article by Julian Mann III, Striving for Efficiency in 
Administrative Litigation: North Carolina’s Office of Administrative Hearings, 15 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 151, 155 (1995): “[A] central panel is an 
autonomous, quasi-judicial, executive branch agency composed of an independent 
cadre of administrative law judges who hear and decide a wide-range of 
administrative cases.”
13 The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in such “due process revolution” 
cases as Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 254 (1970), provided a major incentive for 
states to form central panels.  See John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing 
Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L.
JUDICIARY 5, 5–8 (1994); Lori Kyle Endris & Wayne E. Penrod, Judicial 
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control or influence by, the agencies for which the ALJ conducts 
hearings.14 Instead, the ALJ reports to a chief ALJ or central panel 
director.15 A few central panels have other related duties such as 
publication of the register in which state agency rules are published 
for review, comment, and adoption;16 however, the main duty of all 
Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Indiana’s Environmental Solution,
12 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 126–29 (1996).  As these authors 
explain, Goldberg and related cases greatly expanded the need for fair hearings 
presided over by neutral, unbiased adjudicators such as are found in a central panel.  
For the first time, the cases required states to provide “some kind of hearing” 
presided over by a neutral, unbiased adjudicator before a decision to deprive 
citizens of newly expanded property rights became final.  These rights were now 
held to include many government-conferred benefits such as licenses, welfare 
benefits, and government employment.  Before Goldberg, the courts had regarded 
these benefits as merely governmentally conferred privileges—not property 
rights—and held that as mere privileges they were subject to being taken away by 
the state without any fair hearing requirement.  See William W. Van Alstyne, The 
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968).  After Goldberg, many state legislatures created central panels in 
response to the new hearing requirements.  The articles mentioned earlier in this 
footnote by Hardwick and Endris and Penrod both cite to an influential law review 
article on point by Second Circuit Judge Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975).  In his article, Judge Friendly stresses the 
importance of an impartial adjudicator and opines that the further the ALJ is 
removed from the agency, the greater the likelihood that the hearing will satisfy the 
constitutional neutral adjudicator requirement.  Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, at 
1279.
14 See Levinson, supra note 12, at 236–37.
One of the basic purposes of central panel systems is to give 
ALJs a certain amount of independence from the agencies over 
whose proceedings they preside.  From an organizational 
standpoint, this is accomplished by separating the office of 
administrative hearings from the agencies and excluding the 
agencies from any control over the appointment of ALJs or their 
assignment to specific proceedings.
Id.
15 See Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 81 (1994) (“The central panel corps in the various 
states are headed up by either a chief administrative law judge or a director who is 
usually appointed by the governor with the consent of the state senate.”).
16 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(1c) (2013) (designating the Chief 
ALJ of the OAH or a designee as the “Codifier of Rules”); § 150B-21.1(e) (making 
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central panels is to conduct fair and impartial hearings for other 
agencies.
As another preliminary matter, because my comments in this 
paper are at times based on my own experience, I should state briefly 
what that experience has been.  Most pertinently, I served for more 
than twenty years as the ALJ for the Texas Finance Commission, an 
“umbrella agency” which oversees and coordinates the activities of 
the Texas Department of Banking, the Texas Department of Savings 
and Mortgage Lending, and the Office of Consumer Credit 
Commissioner of Texas.  In addition, I was a contract-hearing officer 
conducting Special Education Due Process Hearings for the Texas 
Education Agency for approximately five years.  
Earlier this year, following forty-nine years of practice, I 
retired to an “of counsel” position with the Austin law firm of 
Craddock and Noelke, PLLC, which specializes in contract ALJ 
work for Texas state agencies.  I have conducted many hearings, but 
have never conducted hearings for a central panel.  Texas is a central 
panel state, but the hearings that I conducted were on subject matters 
or for agencies outside the central panel’s jurisdiction.  All of my
decisions for the Finance Commission agencies were subject to 
agency head review on both facts and law before a final decision was 
issued.  However, to the best of my knowledge, the agencies never 
changed my fact-findings.  I had final decision authority in the 
contract Special Education Due Process Hearings I conducted for the 
Texas Education Agency.
My background also includes eight years doing trial and 
appellate work, in state and federal court, representing state agencies 
and officials as an Assistant Attorney General of Texas and serving 
on the Attorney General’s Opinion Committee; twelve years as an aid 
to three Texas governors (including roughly five years as Assistant 
General Counsel to the Governor); more than five years as an aid to 
the Texas Comptroller (including three years as his General 
Counsel); and a year as Chief Legal Advisor to the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas.  
the Chief ALJ of the OAH or the designee responsible for publication of the Rules 
in the North Carolina Register). 
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II. SPLIT-DECISION AUTHORITY
Before sending a final draft of this paper to the NAALJ 
Journal for publication, I circulated it to administrative adjudication 
experts for review and comment.  The reviewers included the current 
members of the NAALJ Journal Board of Advisors and members of 
the CPDC.  The comments I received gave me the opportunity to see 
some reaction to what I originally wrote, and, in some instances, 
surprised me.  I have revised the paper to respond to some of these 
comments and will from time to time refer to them in the paper as 
comments by early reviewers of the paper.
I had originally planned to defer the discussion of “split-
decision authority” to the second part of the paper as part of the 
discussion of the development of the 2010 MSAPA, since split-
decision authority was an issue raised at several points in the drafting 
sessions.17 However, after reading the comments, I have decided to 
place the discussion of split-decision authority in this first part of the 
paper instead of postponing the discussion.
Two early reviewers of the paper were law professors.  In 
reading the paper, they understood me to argue that either the agency 
head or the ALJ should have final decision authority on both facts 
and law in every case and that there is no middle ground.  
One of the law professors stated:
[The paper] . . . makes agency-head review of ALJ 
decisions an all-or-nothing matter.  There could be 
agency-head review, but within certain constraints or 
agency decisions reversing ALJs could be subjected to 
more rigorous judicial review.  My understanding is 
that in North Carolina, if the agency head modifies or 
overturns the ALJ’s decision, the court will review the 
record de novo.  Indeed, the author alludes to some
proposals to limit agency-head reviewing power, but 
does not challenge those proposals.  Indeed, the author 
does not critique the current North Carolina approach 
to agency-head reversal.  So even if the author has 
convincingly established that a regime of agency-head 
17 Usually, I was the one who raised it.
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review under no constraints should be rejected, he has 
not grappled with the more difficult question of 
whether it makes sense under some constraint.18
I need to clarify my position on the split-decision authority 
issue.  In Part I of the paper as originally circulated, I did not discuss 
split-decision authority at all, and so the professor was drawing an 
inference about what my opinion is on the split-authority issue.  To 
make that opinion perfectly clear, I believe final decision authority
can properly be split so that the ALJ has final authority to decide 
facts and the agency head has final authority to decide policy 
issues.19
One of the law professor reviewers correctly noted that my 
home state of Texas splits final decision authority between the central 
panel ALJ (who has final decision authority over facts) and the 
agency head (who has final decision authority over policy issues).  
Texas has followed this split-decision making model since it became 
a central panel state and, in the opinion of many, it has worked well 
over the years.  Under the original Texas statutes enacting this model 
into law, the central panel ALJ’s fact-findings and conclusions of law 
18 This reviewer is correct as to what North Carolina required at one time 
whenever the agency changed the central panel ALJ’s decision on either facts or 
law.  However, the North Carolina statute has now been amended to give central 
panel ALJs final decision authority without agency review.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
150B-34(a) (2012).  Effective January 1, 2012, the statutory law of North Carolina 
was amended to revise § 150B-34(a) of the General Statutes titled Final Decision 
Order, to read as follows:
(a) In each contested case the administrative law judge shall 
make a final decision or order that contains findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  The administrative law judge shall decide 
the case based upon the preponderance of the evidence, giving 
due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the 
agency with respect to facts and inferences within the specialized 
knowledge of the agency.
Id.
19 The law is for the reviewing court to apply de novo giving great 
deference to the agency’s interpretations of its enabling statute and to any properly 
promulgated agency rules and regulations.  See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 5:28(4), 11:32(1) (3d ed. 2010).
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were subject to agency review and modification only for reasons of 
policy.20 This model has been the subject of several excellent law 
review articles.21 In recent years, the Texas statutes setting forth this 
model have been amended to specify the reasons that an agency head 
can change central panel ALJ fact-findings with greater 
particularity.22 These specific reasons are:
(1) [T]he [ALJ] did not properly apply or interpret 
applicable law, agency rules, written policies . . .  or 
prior administrative decisions; 
(2) [A] prior administrative decision on which the 
[ALJ] relied is incorrect or should be changed; or
(3) [A] technical error in a finding of fact should be 
changed.23
A 2012 Texas CLE panel presentation discussed, among other 
issues, why the legislature reworded the original Texas statutes 
allowing agencies to modify central panel decisions for policy 
reasons. 24 It was because, during review, the heads of litigating 
agencies proposed decisions of central panel ALJs, and sometimes 
the courts had difficulty understanding and consistently applying the 
Texas statutes related to the fact/policy distinction under the statutes 
as originally worded. 25 The primary reason for rewording the 
original language was to make it easier for the agencies and the 
20 See Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings: 
Establishing Independent Adjudications in Contested Case Proceedings While 
Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 119 (2005); F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency 
Change the Findings or Conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge?, 50 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 65 (1998); F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency Change 
the Findings or Conclusions of an ALJ?: Part II, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 63 (1999).
21 See id.
22 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (West 2013).
23 Id.
24 See John M. Hohengarten, Dudley D. McCalla, & Jon Eugene Porter, 
Jr., 7th Annual Advanced Administrative Law Seminar at the University of Texas 
School of Law: Should SOAH Make Final Decisions (Aug. 31, 2012). No paper 
was prepared for this seminar topic and the text statement above is based on my 
recollection and notes of the panel debate.
25 Id.
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courts to consistently apply review standards limiting agency 
authority to change ALJ fact-findings.26
As I expect will be shown in the survey in Part II of this 
paper, many other states have adopted statutory provisions similar to 
the ones in Texas to restrict agency authority to overturn central 
panel ALJ fact-findings.  This would reflect information contained in 
the Central Panel Directors letter to the head of the ULC complaining 
of the ULC’s failure to include discretionary authority for ALJs in 
the 2010 MSAPA. 27 In this regard, the Central Panel Directors 
wrote:
Nearly every jurisdiction that presently has a central 
panel provides in some measure for the option of final 
decision making by central panel judges.  Some 
jurisdictions have granted total final decision authority 
to the central panel but most jurisdictions have a 
combination or a hybrid of recommended and final 
orders.28
I have no problem with the split-decision structure if it works 
satisfactorily in the jurisdictions that have adopted it, and do not 
mean to suggest otherwise in this paper.  Indeed, I fought for the 
split-decision model in the development of the portion of the 2010 
MSAPA related to central panel adjudication.  However, this was one 
of the issues on which the drafting committee did not follow my 
recommendations.
Because I knew that Professor Ron Beal of the Baylor 
University Law School was a strong advocate of this model, I 
contacted him and urged him to present his views on the benefits of 
the split-decision model to the 2010 MSAPA drafting committee.  
Professor Beal presented these views in writing to the drafting 
committee, in part, as follows: 
26 See id. 
27 Letter from Peter Plummer, Head of the Central Panel Directors 
Conference, to the Unif. Law Comm’n (July 6, 2010) (on file with author).
28 Id. (emphasis added).
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I believe that ad law in Texas has fundamentally 
changed for the better by having the ALJ being the 
final authority on basic, underlying facts.  At least [I 
would] suggest to [the drafting committee] they put 
this in [the 2010 MSAPA] as an alternative for states 
who want to truly have an independent but 
interdependent . . . [central panel/agency head] 
decision or order.29
Professor Gregory L. Ogden of Pepperdine University School 
of Law, in his role as the reporter for the 2010 MSAPA, transmitted 
Professor Beal’s comments to the drafting committee, along with 
Professor Ogden’s own comments, as follows:
[N]o change [to add language that incorporates 
Professor Beal’s suggestion in the 2010 MSAPA] [is] 
recommended.  The existing approach [in the draft 
2010 MSAPA] is consistent with the Universal 
Camera federal standard.  This proposal [to make the 
ALJ the final authority on the facts] would . . . make 
ALJ fact determinations almost unreviewable by the
agency head rather than giving deference to the ALJ 
fact findings based on demeanor evidence and 
credibility determinations.30
Professor Ogden’s recommendation—rather than my 
recommendation and Professor Beal’s recommendation on this 
point—was adopted by the drafting committee and by the ULC in the 
final 2010 MSAPA.
To clarify my position in this paper: If faced with the option 
of vesting all final decision authority in the neutral central panel ALJ 
or in the agency head, I would support placing it all in the neutral 
central panel ALJ based on the arguments stated throughout this 
29 Gregory L. Ogden, MSAPA Drafting Committee Agenda for February 
12 to 14, 2010 Meeting, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION 20–21, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/state_administrative_procedure/msapa_de
tailed%20agenda_021210.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
30 Id. 
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paper.  I do not oppose the split-decision model used in Texas and 
other jurisdictions.  It seems to be working well in some states, 
including Texas.  
Although I felt strongly at the time the 2010 MSAPA was 
developed that the split-decision model was the best option for 
central panel adjudication, as I have studied the issue more fully, I 
have come to the view that, perhaps, the best option would be to fully 
develop the record on all issues, let the central panel ALJ write a 
final decision, and let the agency and/or the private litigant appeal to 
the courts if unhappy with the decision.
The information to be provided in the survey results should 
shed further light on this matter.  It will be interesting to see what the 
experience has been in the central panel jurisdictions on the split-
decision option versus the option to place all final decision authority 
on facts and law in either the central panel ALJ or in the litigating 
agencies.
III. MAIN ISSUE PRESENTED
The questions at the heart of this paper are simple:
Should an agency head finally decide cases that a neutral 
central panel ALJ adjudicates when the agency’s staff has actively 
prosecuted or defended the case; or, alternatively, should the central 
panel ALJ who adjudicates the case make the final decision without 
agency review subject to an appeal to the courts by the losing party?
More pointedly, in The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and 
Implementation in Maryland, Judge John W. Hardwicke refers to the 
central panel ALJ as “the hearer,” and he stated this issue as follows:
If, in principle, it is necessary to separate the hearer 
from the agency, is fundamental fairness sacrificed by 
permitting the agency to superimpose its will upon the 
final result?31
31 John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and 
Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 5, 9 (1994).
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I will assume for purposes of this paper that the losing 
party—be it a private party or the administrative agency itself—will 
have a right to appeal an adverse ALJ decision to the courts.32
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE FEDERAL APA; CREATION OF 
THE ALJ POSITION
The federal APA was unanimously adopted by Congress in 
1946 following almost a decade of rancorous debate that was 
interrupted by World War II.33 The resulting legislation is seen today 
32 In the state of Louisiana, the agency cannot appeal if the central panel 
ALJ holds against the agency.  However, I know of no other jurisdiction that is 
seeking to structure ALJ finality in the same way as Louisiana.  Therefore, I will 
not argue about whether ALJ final authority with no appeal for the agency should 
or should not be the law.  I think the subject has pretty much been exhausted in the 
Louisiana Supreme Court case of Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance 
Co., 893 So. 2d. 746 (La. 2005), the law review articles discussing the Wooley
case, and the underlying Louisiana statute.  See Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, 
ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s 
Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431 (1999); April L. Rolen-Ogden, 
When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World: Wooley v. State Farm—Does a 
Denial of Agency Initiated Judicial Review of ALJ Final Orders Violate the 
Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 66 LA. L. REV. 885 (2005); 
Edward P. Richards & Kelly M. Haggar, Administrative Finality and the Pelican 
State: A Recipe for Central Panel Gumbo, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS (Am. Bar 
Ass’n), 2005, at 4; see also Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 410–18
(discussing Wooley); MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 136–37 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing Wooley and 
related issues); James F. Flanagan, Developments in State Administrative Law—
Central Panels Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., AM. BAR ASS’N
(Apr. 19, 2005), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/adminlaw/spring2005/Flanagan_outline.doc (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2013).  People interested in the final central panel ALJ decision 
with no agency appeal issue should read those materials.  As Ann Wise, director of 
the Louisiana Central Panel, correctly points out, the Wooley decision is well 
written and self-explanatory. Ann Wise, Louisiana’s Division of Administrative 
Law: An Independent Hearings Tribunal, 68 LA. L. REV. 1169, 1194 n.84 (2008). 
33 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative 
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558–59
(1996); Michael Asimow, Administrative Law Judges: The Past and the Future,
N.Y. STATE ADMIN. LAW JUDGES ASS’N, http://www.nysalja.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/aljpastandfuture.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013); Arthur 
Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 
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as a political compromise between the New Dealers (who wanted 
agencies to have almost unfettered authority to exercise control over 
the economy), and the “judicialists” (who wanted to assure that all 
agency authority was exercised in strict conformity with stringent 
due process requirements). 34 The New Dealers viewed the 
judicialists and all but very minimal due process requirements as 
obstructing the reforms needed to preserve and strengthen the 
American economy.35 The New Dealers viewed the very ability of 
the American economy to survive the Great Depression to be at stake 
in the battle with the judicialists over administrative procedural 
requirements.36
These circumstances begin to get at the root of the debate that 
caused such rancor over the 2010 MSAPA.  One of the questions that 
we, as a profession, might ask in reviewing the final decision for 
central panel issue is whether the limitations on due process thought 
to have been appropriate at the national level when the very future of 
the nation’s economy was thought to be in jeopardy are still 
appropriate in central panel state administrative adjudication today.  
The overriding belief of the New Dealers, which became part of the 
background for the compromise incorporated in the 1946 federal 
APA was that, unless due process shortcuts were taken, the national 
economy would irrevocably crumble.37 This was a strong argument 
during the depression of the 1930s, less so by 1946 with post-war 
boom in the U.S. economy beginning to get underway, and is of little 
if any weight today when considering a state rather than a federal 
APA.  Given that such concerns are not in play in state central panel 
adjudications, it is worth revisiting the issue of the extent to which 
agency control over policy should take precedence over providing a 
fair adjudication to both the agency and individual litigants in those 
adjudications.  As a profession, we may need to ask whether it is time 
to consider readjusting the scales.
298 (1986); JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59–108 (2012).
34 See Asimow, supra note 33; see also Shepherd, supra note 33, at 1678.
35 See Asimow, supra note 33, at 1559, 1561–62.
36 See id.
37 See id.; Shepherd, supra note 33.
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Many would argue that it is.  In his paper, Tracing the Unique 
Contours of Administrative Justice: Reconceptualizing the Judicial 
Model for Administrative Law, David E. Guinn writes that, “Having 
agency supervisors alter an ALJ’s factual determination would both 
appear and would in fact interfere with the party’s right to a fair and 
impartial hearing.”38
I come at this argument with a clear point of view.  Mr. Guinn 
is undoubtedly right about what fairness requires. I also believe that 
eventually all central panel states are likely to make it more difficult 
for agency heads to overturn central panel ALJ fact-findings.  The 
rationale here is simple.  With a neutral final decision-maker now 
available in the central panel states, if one were starting over from 
scratch, why would one place a litigant in charge of the final 
decision?  This may have been appropriate when the federal system 
was originally designed and the necessity of dealing quickly and 
efficiently with the economic problems brought about by the Great 
Depression and World War II justified—or were used to justify—the 
near infringement on rights of the regulated community; but are such 
infringements now necessary or appropriate in modern-day central 
panel state administrative adjudication?
Historians trace the origin of the ALJ position to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1906 to 1907.39 The ICC, pursuant 
to statutory authorization by Congress, appointed agency staff 
members as hearing examiners to take evidence when the 
commissioners were too busy attending to other duties to personally 
hear the evidence.40 After the hearing, the examiner made a report to 
the ICC that contained a summary of the evidence and sometimes the 
examiner’s recommendations about how the commission should 
decide the case.41 By 1917, these reports were usually, if not always, 
38 David E. Guinn, Tracing the Unique Contours of Administrative 
Justice: Reconceptualizing the Judicial Model for Administrative Law 20 (Sept. 26, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017306. 
39 See Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Charles H. Koch, Jr., Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in 2
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS &
REPORTS 799 (1992).
40 See id.
41 See id.
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written and had more or less assumed the format of today’s ALJ 
recommended decisions.42 Traditionally, ALJs have been part of an 
agency’s staff and subject to the agency’s control.  Prior to the 
federal APA’s enactment in 1946 (and still in some state agencies 
and in some federal agencies not subject to the federal APA), they 
sometimes had—and still have—other duties in addition to presiding 
in administrative hearings.43
The use of in-house ALJs to perform duties other than 
presiding in administrative hearings has been discontinued in the 
agencies subject to the federal APA. 44 The federal APA now 
contains several provisions designed to keep an in-house ALJ 
insulated from improper influences by his or her employing agency.45
These provisions include merit selection of ALJs through competitive 
examination by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which 
sends the agency a list of the top three candidates from which the 
42 See id.
43 See id. at 799–800 (footnotes omitted): 
The roles and duties of examiners [the early designation for 
ALJs] were not always clearly confined to a purely judge-like 
role during the several decades prior to enactment of the APA.  
Although examiners generally tended to preside over trial-type 
hearings for the agencies, they sometimes performed 
investigatory duties and, in some agencies, they consulted 
extensively with superiors about how cases before them should 
be decided.  Writing 9 years after the FTC was established, 
Henderson (the historian of the FTC) observed that it was then 
customary for the precomplaint investigation of a case to be 
conducted by one of the Commissioner’s examiners.  
Henderson’s report of this use of examiners shows that 
examiners were not then viewed as personnel committed solely 
to judging, but were apparently considered to be open to a wider 
range of tasks . . . .  The practice of examiners consulting with 
agency officials about proposed reports was also followed 
extensively in the ICC’s Bureau of Formal Cases.
44 “Administrative law judges . . . may not perform duties inconsistent 
with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges.”  5 U.S.C. § 
3105 (2006). 
45 See 5 U.S.C. § 1305; 5 C.F.R. Part 930, Subpart B–Administrative Law 
Judge Program (2013).
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agency must choose an ALJ.46 Further, under the federal APA, pay 
raises are not controlled by the federal agency employing the ALJ, 
but by the OPM.47 Finally, federal ALJs may not be supervised by 
agency staff with prosecutorial or investigative responsibilities.48
Despite precautions to prevent undue influence on the ALJ by 
the agency, the public remains skeptical.  As Bernard Segal, a past 
president of the ABA, explained:
[There is an] unavoidable appearance of bias when an 
administrative law judge, attached to an agency, is 
presiding in litigation by that agency against a private 
party.  One can fill the pages of the United States 
Code with legislation intended to guarantee the 
independence of the administrative law judge; but so 
long as that judge has offices in the same building as 
the agency staff, so long as the seal of the agency 
adorns the bench on which that judge sits, so long as 
that judge’s assignment to the case is by the very 
agency whose actions or contentions that judge is 
being called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, for that judge to convey the image of 
an impartial fact finder.49
Moreover, despite the federal APA’s intended separation of 
federal ALJs from improper agency influences in deciding cases, 
there have been numerous credible assertions, some supported by 
judicial findings, that federal agencies have failed to honor the 
separation provisions and have attempted to interfere with ALJ 
independence.50
46 5 C.F.R. § 930.204. 
47 5 C.F.R. § 930.205.
48 “The employee who presides at the reception of evidence . . . may not—
. . . (2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee 
or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for 
an agency.”  5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2006) (footnote omitted).
49 Bernard G. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of 
Progress and the Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. J. 1424, 1426 (1976).  
50 See Mahoney v. Donovan, 721 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  Mahoney 
was an ALJ for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  
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Attempts by state agency personnel to intimidate state agency 
ALJs to decide in favor of the agency have also apparently been quite 
common.51
See id. at 634.  He alleged among other infractions of the Federal APA that: HUD 
had assigned cases based on likelihood of favorable ruling for the agency rather 
than randomly; his superiors had ex parte communications with private litigants 
regarding the management of cases pending on his docket without giving him 
notice or the opportunity to participate; his superiors had withdrawn staff support in 
retaliation for his reporting APA violations to federal officials authorized to take 
action against agency misconduct; and they were notifying the Justice Department 
of upcoming cases before private parties were notified thereby giving the 
government an unfair advantage. See id. at 634 n.1; Mahoney v. Donovan, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d 49, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d in part, 721 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
Federal trial and appellate courts held that ALJ Mahoney lacked standing to raise 
these issues and that some of them were not timely raised and were barred by 
limitations.  See also Debra Cassens Moss, Judges Under Fire—ALJ Independence 
at Issue, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1991, at 56, 56–57 (1991). Department of Interior Chief 
ALJ McKenna alleged that in retaliation for his testimony to Congress and in a 
grievance proceeding against the Department of Interior (DOI), his DOI superiors 
initiated a reduction in force (RIF) action to eliminate his job.  See also McKenna 
v. Dept. of the Interior, No. 92-3520, 1993 WL 142069 (Fed. Cir. May 4, 1993).  A
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) ALJ held a hearing on McKenna’s claim.  
The MSPB ALJ found that ALJ McKenna’s immediate superiors had initiated the 
RIF because they “harbor[ed] animosity” towards McKenna, but this animosity did 
not invalidate the RIF because the ALJ’s superiors did not have authority to carry it 
out and approval of the action by the Secretary of the Interior was not shown to be 
motivated by animosity toward McKenna but was permissible as a legitimate 
reduction in force action.  See id. at *1–2.  This decision was affirmed on appeal.  
McKenna v. Dept. of the Interior, 996 F.2d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Daniel 
F. Solomon, Fundamental Fairness, Judicial Efficiency and Uniformity: Revisiting 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 52, 
63–66 (2013) (regarding the actions taken against Social Security ALJs during the 
Carter administration to intimidate them to rule against recovery by claimants); 
DONNA PRICE COFER, JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE QUESTION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING 
PROCESS 182 (Greenwood Press 1985) (reporting that in her 1982 nationwide 
survey of Social Security ALJs, seventy percent of the respondents reported they 
had received pressure from the Social Security Administration to deny more claims 
for recovery against the Social Security trust fund).
51 See, e.g., Erick Williams, Off the Record: Michigan’s Ex Parte Law 
Needs Reform, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2002, at 24 (2002), available at 
http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article387.pdf.  In his article, Erick 
Williams, a state ALJ, complained of the use of command influence by 
administrative agency heads at the Michigan Department of Corrections to pressure 
ALJs to rule in favor of the Department and against those challenging the agency.  
                                                                                                                                             
Fall 2013 Final Decision Authority and the Central Panel ALJ 491
V. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE MODEL STATE APAS
(MSAPAS)
Unlike the federal APA, which was hammered out amidst 
turmoil as a compromise between New Dealers and the judicialists 
(with the ABA on the side of the judicialists), the first MSAPA in 
1946 was developed in a far more leisurely manner as a NCCUSL 
and ABA joint product.52 Early drafts were widely circulated to state 
See id. at 28–29.  In response to Erick Williams’s article, a state assistant attorney 
general (Assistant AG) argued that a state ALJ is not a real judge.  See Michael 
Lockman, Speaking Out: Off the Record—Michigan’s Ex Parte Law Needs Reform,
MICH. B.J., May 2002, at 48, 48 (quoting Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. Pers. Dir. 
of State, 402 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).  Therefore, the Assistant AG 
argued, ex parte attempts to influence the ALJ’s decision by agency supervisors 
were not only permissible but, in fact, the agency heads were just doing their jobs 
in pressuring ALJs to rule for the agency in the individual contested cases that 
came before them for decision.  See id. A second commenter also challenged the 
factual allegations made by Williams.  See id. at 49; see also Ronnie A. Yoder, The 
Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 322
(2002) (discussing other cases in which state ALJs were disciplined for ruling 
against their agencies and in favor of private parties); see also Ed Hein, Alaska 
ALJ, Remarks Before the Alaska State Legislature Joint Committee on 
Administrative Regulation Review (Feb. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/M/HARR2003-02-190858.PDF.  Mr. Hein 
testified that, 
An inherent conflict always exists when a hearing officer is 
employed [as an in-house agency employee].  He [or she] has the 
same supervisor as the person issuing the initial determinations 
[of violations or denial of an application or permit].  His [or her] 
supervisor understands that [the ALJ] will disagree with [the 
initial agency determination and rule against the agency] at times.  
However, agency administrators are not always that enlightened.  
[Hein] has heard many stories at national conferences where 
hearing officers are pressured into changing their decisions.  
Hearing officers have quotas and cannot side against the 
[employing] agency too often.
Id. at 13–14. 
52 See Albert S. Abel, The Double Standard in Administrative Procedure 
Legislation: Model Act and Federal Act, 33 IOWA L. REV. 228, 229 (1948) 
(discussing the differences between the model act and federal act in administrative 
procedure legislation).
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and local bar associations and to academics for comments and 
suggestions. 53 Insofar as has been reported, there were no hotly 
debated issues in the drafting of the 1946 MSAPA.54 Instead, the 
1946 APA seems to have been a consensus government reform 
measure fully supported by both NCCUSL and the ABA. 55 Its 
adoption was postponed until after Congress adopted the federal 
APA to make certain that the MSAPA meshed with the final federal 
APA.56
Although compatible with the federal APA, from the first 
MSAPA in 1946 to the fourth and most recent MSAPA in 2010, the 
MSAPAs have never been identical to the federal APA.57 Two law 
review articles comparing the federal APA and the MSAPAs 
observed that the MSAPAs have only a “cousinly” rather than a more 
direct family resemblance to the federal APA.58 Professor Michael 
Asimow, an expert in administrative law, has declared that in drafting 
a state APA, the draftsman should be aware of the provisions of the 
federal APA, should borrow from those provisions which have 
worked well, and should avoid provisions which have not worked so 
well.59 Professor Asimow does not contend that the draftsman of a 
state APA has any obligation to follow the federal APA except 
insofar as he or she chooses to do so.60
53 Id.
54 Id. at 229–33.
55 Id.
56 Bonfield, supra note 33, at 298.
57 Id.
58 Abel, supra note 52, at 229; Bonfield, supra note 33, at 302. 
59 See Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act on California’s New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.
REV. 297, 297 (1996).
60 Id.  Professor Asimow writes:
A reformer who sets out to modernize a state’s APA 
necessarily turns first to . . . the Federal APA.  The pathways of 
that statute are embedded in every administrative lawyer’s mental 
map.  If a federal provision seems to have worked well, that 
provision is the logical starting point in drafting a state law.  If 
the provision has generated major problems in application, that 
lesson should also be taken to heart.
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Dean E. Blythe Stason of the University of Michigan School 
of Law chaired the MSAPA drafting committees for both the 1946 
and the 1961 MSAPAs.61 Frank E. Cooper assisted in the drafting of 
the 1961 MSAPA as a staff consultant (probably the same position 
that the ULC now calls “reporter”—the person who does the actual 
drafting under the drafting committee’s guidance).62 Dean Stason 
previously worked on the 1941 U.S. Attorney General’s Committee 
on Administrative Procedure and was part of the three-member 
coalition filing a minority report. 63 Stason helped draft proposed 
legislation to accompany the minority coalition report.64 That draft 
legislation, with revision, eventually morphed into the federal APA.65
VI. THE BENJAMIN REPORT: “CENTRAL PANELS WITHOUT FINAL 
DECISION AUTHORITY DO NOT GO FAR ENOUGH”; RELATION 
BETWEEN FACT-FINDING AND POLICY
The earliest reference to the central panel ALJ final decision 
authority issue is contained in the 1942 Benjamin Report, written by 
Robert M. Benjamin.66 The Benjamin Report was a major influence 
on the 1946 MSAPA.67 It was the first comprehensive study of state 
administrative law in any jurisdiction, and its suggestions were of 
value far beyond the State of New York.68
Largely forgotten today, Robert M. Benjamin was a 
distinguished and well-known lawyer in his day.69 After service in 
World War I as an infantry captain, he entered Harvard Law School 
Id.
61 Bonfield, supra note 33, at 300.
62 See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW viii (1965). 
63 Bonfield, supra note 33, at 300.
64 COOPER, supra note 62, at 6–7.
65 Id.
66 ROBERT M. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE HERBERT H. LEHMAN, GOVERNOR OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1942).
67 COOPER, supra note 62, at 6–7.
68 See id. at 5 n.5.
69 Robert M. Benjamin Dies at 69; Lawyer Served as State Official; 
Moreland Act Commissioner had Headed Regents Unit—Aided Hiss Appeal, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1966, at 33. 
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and graduated in 1922.70 He then clerked for U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes before entering private law practice.71
In the later years of his career, he headed the team of appellate 
lawyers who represented Alger Hiss on his appeal from a perjury 
conviction for lying to the House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC) in hearings concerning Hiss’s alleged espionage activity.72
This was a cause célèbre and the case that first brought HUAC 
member Richard M. Nixon to national attention.73 In mid-career, 
Benjamin accepted an appointment by New York Governor Herbert 
H. Lehman as a special commissioner under New York’s Moreland 
Act to study administrative adjudication in the State of New York.74
The prefatory notes for the first and second MSAPAs (the 
1946 and 1961 MSAPAs) acknowledge the influence and importance 
of the Benjamin Report in drafting these model acts.75 As already 
discussed, Frank E. Cooper (the author of a 1965 two-volume treatise 
on state administrative law) declared the Benjamin Report to be the 
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Mr. Benjamin is shown as lead counsel in the court papers.  See, e.g.,
ROBERT M. BENJAMIN, ALGER HISS, PETITIONER, V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
U.S. SUPREME COURT TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD WITH SUPPORTING PLEADINGS
(Gale 2011), http://www.amazon.com/Petitioner-America-Transcript-Supporting-
Pleadings/dp/1270372238 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
73 See Jennie Weber, Nixon and the Alger Hiss Case, AMERICAN 
PRESIDENTS BLOG (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.american-
presidents.org/2008/12/nixon-and-alger-hiss-case.html?m=1; see also Douglas 
Linder, The Alger Hiss Trials: An Account,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/hiss.html (last visited Nov. 25, 
2013).
74 See Robert M. Benjamin Dies at 69, supra note 69.  In addition to the 
accomplishments listed above, Benjamin served on the Board of Regents of the 
New York State Educational Department and the Board of Directors of the 
American Judicature Society.  At the time of his death, he was chairman of an 
ABA special committee on a proposed Code of Federal Administrative Procedure 
to replace the federal Administrative Procedure Act and was a member of the 
Board of Directors of the American Bar Foundation.  He was also on the Board of 
Trustees of the Practising Law Institute (PLI).  Id.
75 See MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § Ref. & Annos., U.L.A. 175–76 
(1961); see also MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § Ref. & Annos., U.L.A. 174–
76 (1946).
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first serious and comprehensive study of state administrative law.76
He also compared it favorably to the 1941 Final Report of the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (Final 
Report)—the primary study underlying the federal APA.77 In a panel 
discussion celebrating the 40th anniversary of the federal APA, 
Walter Gellhorn, who headed the staff that produced the 1941 Final 
Report, brought up Benjamin’s name and the Benjamin Report and 
acknowledged the parallels between the Final Report and the 
Benjamin Report.78
The Benjamin Report consists of six volumes.79 Its focus is 
on administrative adjudication as conducted in New York at the time 
that Benjamin and his assistants conducted the study and wrote the 
report (roughly 1939–1942). 80 Five of the volumes describe and 
analyze the adjudication procedures employed by each of the major 
New York state agencies.81 The sixth volume is unnumbered and is a 
summary volume containing Benjamin’s recommendations on how 
state administrative adjudication could be improved.82
In the Benjamin Report’s summary volume, Benjamin 
discusses the concepts of final decision authority for central panels.83
None of these central panels were yet in existence—anywhere—and 
the name “central panel” had not yet been coined.  Nonetheless, 
Benjamin considered and discussed the central panel concept and 
final decision authority.  Benjamin said that if such panels were 
created, they should be given final decision authority.84 Benjamin 
reached this conclusion through the following logic: 
76 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
77 See COOPER, supra note 62, at 10.
78 Walter Gellhorn, Kenneth Culp Davis, & Paul Verkuil, Present at the 
Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 516 (1986).
79 Reprinted in three cloth bound volumes by William S. Hein and Co. 
(2001), available at http://www.lawbookexchange.com/pages/books/32150/robert-
m benjamin/administrative-adjudication-in-the-state-of-new-york-6-vols.
80 Benjamin was appointed in 1939 and published the report in 1942.  
BENJAMIN, supra note 66.
81 Id. at 65–66.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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Another suggestion, with which I disagree, calls for 
brief mention.  The suggestion is that all hearings be 
conducted by trial examiners appointed by, and 
subject to removal only by, some agency independent 
of . . . [the agency litigating with the private citizen or 
company].  If the decisions of such independent trial 
examiners were, as is sometimes suggested, given 
finality (subject only to judicial review), the change 
would be not merely a change in internal organization; 
the trial examiners would constitute an independent 
adjudicating agency . . . .  If, on the other hand, the 
decisions of such trial examiners were not given 
finality, the change in internal organization would not 
go far enough towards accomplishing the purpose of a 
separation of functions.  The existence of . . . [the 
head of the litigating agency’s] ultimate power to 
review and reverse would, even if it were not 
frequently exercised, tend to impair the confidence in 
impartial adjudication which it is a primary purpose of 
the separation of functions to foster.  In any case 
where . . . [the agency litigating with the private 
citizen or company] actually reversed a decision of the 
trial examiner favorable to the respondent, the very 
fact of the trial examiner’s independence would 
aggravate the objection to the [head of the litigating 
agency’s] duality of function.85
Benjamin was not alone in this line of argument.  An 
unpublished essay by Allen C. Hoberg, Director of the North Dakota 
Central Panel, contains reasoning parallel to Benjamin’s reasoning.86
Hoberg writes:
85 Id.
86 Allen C. Hoberg, Final Decision Making By Hearing Officers 1–2
(unpublished memorandum) (Dec. 11, 2003) (on file with author). Hoberg is the 
longtime director of the North Dakota Central Panel.  He wrote this memorandum 
at the request of the Advisory Committee to the North Dakota Office of 
Administrative Hearings and made it available to me to use in writing this paper.
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The appearance of fairness should extend not only to 
the decision maker in the first instance (at the hearing 
and recommended decision stage) but also to the final 
decision stage.  Certainly, it is beneficial and appears 
to be fair, to have a hearing conducted by, and the 
recommended decision issued by, an independent HO.  
Yet, that appearance of fairness can be compromised 
when the final decision maker is the agency head [of 
the agency litigating against the private citizen].87
Law review articles arguing in favor of agency head authority 
to overturn the ALJ fact-findings often argue that the agency heads 
need final decision authority to make certain the ALJ correctly 
applies agency policy to the facts of each case. 88 However, the 
Benjamin Report makes an observation that these critics have failed 
to address.  Benjamin writes:
There are many matters within the scope of agency 
adjudication in which policy plays a proper, and often 
a necessary, part.  It may play such a part in 
interpreting a statute which the administrator is 
charged with enforcing, or in determining the penalty 
that should be imposed for a particular offense, or in 
determining the course of action that the administrator 
should follow, or require to be followed, on the basis 
of facts properly found.  But policy should play no 
part in the decision of questions of fact; policy, rightly 
understood, cannot call for the decision of a question 
of fact in a particular way.
To illustrate: The State Liquor Authority may 
properly take the policy of the statute into account in 
specifying the kinds of action by a manufacturer or 
wholesaler that constitute a gift or service to a retail 
licensee tending to influence such licensee to purchase 
the product of the manufacturer or wholesaler, in 
violation of Section 101 of the Alcoholic Beverage 
87 Id.
88 See infra Part X.
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Control Law.  But policy has no proper place in a 
determination of whether a particular manufacturer or 
wholesaler has in fact been guilty of that kind of 
action.  Once a violation has been found to exist in 
fact, policy may again come into play in determining 
the penalty.
The distinction that I suggest has not always 
been clear in the minds of administrative judges.  It is 
my hope that this report will make it so.  If this 
distinction is kept in mind in administrative 
adjudication, much will have been done to meet 
whatever problem now exists.  The administrative 
judge must still, however, understand that even when 
policy plays a proper part it should be applied with the 
fair-minded deliberation that characterizes responsible 
adjudication . . . .89
Retired Oregon Supreme Court Justice W. Michael Gillette 
made this same point more succinctly, saying, “The facts are 
whatever they are, and the legal consequences that flow from them 
flow only from them after we decide what the facts are.  The facts are 
not what they are because the law is what it is; the facts are what they 
are, period.”90
One of the early reviewers of this article took issue with 
Justice Gillette’s “facts are the facts” point.  He wrote:  
I think that’s far too simplistic—what ALJ’s decide 
are not the actual facts, but their inference about what 
the facts are based on particular evidence and 
testimony provided in the proceeding.  Presumptions 
are important in addressing uncertainties about what 
the facts actually are and involve policy consideration, 
namely which side do we want to err on (knowing that 
89 BENJAMIN, supra note 66, at 22–24.
90 W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges, Judicial 
Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 20 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 95, 115 (2000).
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uncertainty and error are an inevitable part of any fact 
finding).
To this, my response is that the same comment could be made 
about the entire common law adjudication system—all “facts” are the 
fact finder’s interpretation of testimony, documents, and other 
admissible evidence, whether the fact finder is a general jurisdiction 
judge, jury, an ALJ, or an agency head.  But how fair is it for one of 
the litigants—instead of the neutral presiding officer in the case—to 
determine what the facts of the case actually are?  That is the point to 
be decided.  The ancient maxim “nemo iudex in causa sua,” 
translated as “no person should be a judge in their own cause,” is 
applicable here and supports the transfer of final decision authority 
on fact-findings to the neutral central panel ALJ.  
VII. AGENCY HEAD AUTHORITY TO OVERRULE ALJ FACT 
FINDINGS—WHERE DID THIS AUTHORITY ORIGINATE AND WHAT 
ARGUMENTS SUPPORT IT?
In extensive reading on the final decision by central panel 
ALJs issue, I have yet to find any attempt to logically justify the 
conclusion that the head of an agency involved in the adjudication 
should be able to overrule ALJ fact-findings.  The agency head, as 
one of the litigants, has a built-in conflict of interest and has not had 
the ALJ’s opportunity to observe and question the witnesses to 
clarify their testimony.91
91 See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(examining “the incongruity of allowing an agency official who has seen only the 
paper record to substitute his judgment for that of an adjudicatory officer ‘with 
independent status, who saw the witnesses’ demeanor and gauged their 
truthfulness.’”) (citing Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).  
Michael Asimow has commented on related issues.  Under the then existing 
California APA, 
An agency that is dissatisfied with a proposed decision simply 
rejects it and makes its own determinations of fact, law, and 
policy from the cold record.  Since agency heads are frequently 
part-time appointees who have little time to give to their agency 
responsibilities, the actual determination of rejection (and the 
preparation of a new opinion) is done by agency staff.  This 
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The primary support for the conclusion that the head of an 
agency involved in the adjudication should be able to overrule ALJ 
fact-findings seems to be “that is the way we have always done it.”  
At the federal level, the federal APA gives agency heads the 
authority to overrule ALJ fact-findings.92 At both the federal and 
state levels, the agency heads have likewise always had this authority 
when the ALJ was an in-house agency employee.  All too often, this 
is treated as the end of the discussion about whether or not such 
practice makes much sense in states which have adopted the central 
panel model.  
cavalier treatment of proposed decisions sharply detracts from 
the vitally important function of administrative judges as a check 
on the possible institutional bias of the agency heads or staff.
. . . .
. . . [P]ersons who have engaged in a hearing before a judge 
resent a substitution of credibility findings by agency heads who 
never heard the witnesses testify.  Such persons tend to be more 
trusting of administrative judges who are relatively independent 
and insulated from contact with adversary staff members.  
Moreover, efficiency is served by giving greater finality to the 
judge’s findings rather than encouraging agency heads to reject 
the judge’s findings and substitute their own.  Finally, I believe 
that a judge who has lived with a case, often for days or weeks, 
and heard and saw all of the witnesses, is more likely to reach 
accurate credibility findings than are persons whose only contact 
with the case is a relatively brief exposure to a written transcript.
See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: 
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1115 (1992) (footnote 
omitted); see also FRANK E. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE 
COURTS 155 (William S. Hein & Co. 1951), which comments in part as follows, 
with regard to what Mr. Cooper sees as a “problem inherent in the very nature of 
administrative tribunals”:
Charged as they are with responsibility for the advancement of a 
particular public policy, their desire to enforce that policy renders 
it difficult for them to appraise with impassive objectivity the 
evidence adduced at the hearing.  Their special experience and 
conviction may lead them to find claims clearly established on a 
record which would leave a disinterested judge in doubt.
92 See Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012). 
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States that have adopted the central panel model have a 
choice.  They can grant authority over the final fact-finding to the 
head of the litigating agency or to the independent central panel 
ALJ.93 This option did not exist under the traditional adjudication 
model in which the ALJ was an agency employee. 94 Professor 
Flanagan explains the choice available with the creation of central 
panels, writing, in part:
Before central panels, administrative adjudication was 
clearly the sole province of the agency.  The contested 
case took place at the agency and fact-finding by the 
ALJ was a preliminary step to the agency’s rendering 
the final decision.  Neither the process nor an APA 
accorded the findings of the ALJ special status, and 
proposed decisions by ALJs were clearly subject to 
review and amendment by the agency.  With central 
panels, adjudication becomes a two-step process with 
fact-finding now taking place before a trained 
adjudicator outside the agency who renders a 
preliminary decision.  Agency review follows as a 
separate and distinctive step in which the case returns 
to the agency for another decision.  From the 
participant’s point of view, an agency that does not 
adopt the ALJ’s decision favoring the litigant is 
biased, and if the agency affirms the ALJ’s decision, 
its decision is irrelevant, and the [agency head review] 
process [is] time consuming, and expensive.  The 
creation of the central panel has transferred the focus 
of adjudication from the final agency decision to the 
fact-finding by the ALJ, and enhanced the latter’s 
importance and status.95
93 See, e.g., Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3.
94 See id. at 422–23.
95 Id.
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VIII. STATES NOT REQUIRED TO FOLLOW THE FEDERAL APA AND 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL APA
IN THE UNIVERSAL CAMERA DECISION
In drafting their individual APAs, the states are free to follow 
the “laboratories of democracy” theory.96 They are not bound by the 
federal APA except insofar as they choose to adopt its provisions or, 
perhaps, insofar as some provisions in the federal APA may be 
constitutionally required by due process concerns.97 In fact, most 
states have patterned their APAs on one or more of the MSAPAs 
rather than on the federal APA.98
Under the federal APA, the agency head (or his or her 
designated review panel or official exercising authority delegated by 
the agency head) may overrule both ALJ findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 99 This is as required by the language of the 
federal APA (5 U.S.C § 557(b)) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NRLB. 100 Section 557(b) 
states in pertinent part that, “On appeal from or review of the initial 
96 Justice Louis Brandeis popularized the laboratories of democracy 
metaphor.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  
The metaphor means that, except as limited by the U.S. Constitution or a state’s 
own constitution, a state or local government may enact such legislation as its 
legislative body considers appropriate and act as experimental labs for legislation 
that other states and the federal government might later wish to emulate.  The 
theory has been quoted with approval in many Supreme Court cases over the years 
since Justice Brandeis first introduced it.  See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 
171 (2009); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980).
97 For a discussion of due process issues affecting administrative cases, 
and the differences between the federal APA and state approaches in this regard, 
see Arthur Earl Bonfield, supra note 33, at 323 n.107.
98 See id. at 297.
99 See Starrett v. Special Counsel, 792 F.2d 1246, 1252 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(“Under administrative law principles, an agency or board is free either to adopt or 
reject an ALJ’s findings and conclusions of law.”); see also Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
100 5 U.S.C. § 557(b); Universal Camera Corp. v. NRLB, 340 U.S. 474, 
494 (1951).
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decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in 
making the initial decision . . . .”101
In Universal Camera, the Supreme Court held that the quoted 
statutory language allows an agency head subject to the federal APA 
to overrule ALJ fact-findings even if the ALJ’s findings are based on 
credibility of the witnesses which the agency head has not had the 
opportunity to observe.102
This rule in Universal Camera is the opposite of the rule 
normally applied when appellate courts review fact-findings of lower 
courts.  Normally, the appellate court defers to the lower court’s fact-
findings since the appellate court did not have the lower court’s 
opportunity to observe witness demeanor.103
101 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
102 See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 495–96.
103 The Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure of the Second Hoover 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1953) 
recommended that, in review of ALJ decisions, the federal agencies be limited to 
the same type of fact review that the appellate courts exercise over lower court fact-
findings, but its recommendations were not adopted.  See JOANNA L. GRISINGER,
THE UNWIELDY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE 
NEW DEAL 216 (2012) (“The decisions of hearing commissioners were . . . to have 
as much authority as the decisions of trial courts when reviewed by federal 
appellate courts.  Hearing commissioners’ findings of fact would be final unless the 
agency on review determined that the findings were clearly erroneous.”).  If this 
recommendation of the Task Force had been enacted, federal law with regard to 
agency authority over fact-findings would have been the same as advocates of final 
fact-finding for central panel ALJs claim it should be in the central panel 
jurisdictions.  In accord with the Task Force, Bernard Schwartz, author of a popular 
treatise on administrative law, wrote:  
[Federal agency review of ALJ fact findings] should be eliminated 
by a statute limiting the agency on appeals from ALJ decisions to 
appellate power.  Congress could accomplish this by removing 
from . . . the APA the provision: “On appeal from or review of the 
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have 
in making the initial decision.”  In its place, there should be a
provision that, on review of an ALJ initial decision, the agency 
shall have only the powers of review that a court has upon judicial 
review of the agency’s decisions.
Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
TULSA L.J. 203, 218 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
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Under Universal Camera, the agency head or agency review 
authority must explain why it is overruling ALJ fact-findings. 104
Furthermore, the ALJ’s fact-findings to the contrary of those made 
by the agency remain part of the record on review.105 Stated another 
way, reviewing courts weigh the ALJ’s findings against the agency’s 
findings to determine what weight to give the agency fact-findings 
and whether the agency head findings are supported by substantial 
evidence.106 But under the federal APA and the Universal Camera
decision, the agency head (or agency review authority) fact-findings, 
not the fact-findings of the ALJ, are considered presumptively correct 
by the appellate reviewing court.107
The Universal Camera decision is not based on an 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.  It is based instead on an 
interpretation of the language of the federal APA.108 Therefore, it is 
not binding on the states unless they independently choose to adopt 
it.  The federal APA does not govern central panel adjudications.  
Each state and local central panel jurisdiction is instead governed by 
a separate statute or ordinance, which does not necessarily follow the 
federal APA on the issue of agency head authority to overrule ALJ 
fact-findings.  
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATING FINAL DECISION 
AUTHORITY TO CENTRAL PANEL ALJS
It is black letter law that an administrative agency is a 
creature of statute (or sometimes of a constitutional provision).109 An 
administrative agency has no inherent authority other than what the 
drafters of the statute or the framers of the constitution have given 
104 See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 494.
105 See id. at 493.
106 See id. at 496.  
107 One of the early reviewers of this article argues that Universal Camera 
in effect requires federal agency heads to defer to all ALJ fact-findings based on 
credibility determinations.  A number of lower federal courts initially thought that, 
but the Supreme Court itself has rejected that interpretation of its Universal 
Camera decision.  See FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955).
108 See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 487–96.
109 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 12 (2004).
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it. 110 It may exercise only those powers expressly granted by 
statutory or constitutional provision together with those powers 
necessarily implied by the powers it is expressly granted. 111 An 
agency may not improvise upon its express powers so as to confer 
authority on itself indirectly that it has not been granted either 
expressly or by necessary implication.112
In those states which have adopted central panel ALJ final 
decision authority, the legislatures have made the decision to change 
the regulatory scheme from the traditional one in which the agency 
makes the final decision and the ALJ only makes a recommendation.  
By definition, to the extent that a state legislature has transferred final 
decision authority from the agency to the central panel ALJ, it has 
created an exception to the agency’s traditional authority.  Unless 
there is some provision in the state or federal constitution prohibiting 
the legislature from doing what it enacts legislation to accomplish, 
the legislation will stand as part of state law.  Unlike Congress, which 
has authority to exercise only delegated powers expressly granted 
under the U.S. Constitution or arising by necessary implication from 
the powers expressly granted, state legislatures have plenary 
legislative power to enact all legislation except as their plenary power 
has been limited either expressly or by necessary implication by the 
state or federal constitutions.113
110 Id. § 107.
111 See id.
112 See id. § 109.
113 See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 15–16
(1998); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF THE AMERICAN UNION 173–74 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 1999) (1868) 
[hereinafter COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS] (“Congress can pass no 
laws but such as the Constitution authorizes either expressly or by clear 
implication; while the State legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its 
legislation is not prohibited.”).  COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS is the 
classic comparative work on state constitutions.  Originally published in 1868, it 
went through seven updated editions by 1903.  After being out-of-print for many 
years, this book was reprinted by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., in 1999 and again 
in 2011.  It compares the many state constitutions with one another and with the 
federal Constitution.  Some of it is now out-of-date due to developments since 
Cooley originally wrote the book, but its basic premises are still applicable to 
modern day comparative analysis of state constitutions.  Its author, Thomas M. 
Cooley, was the first dean of the University of Michigan Law School, a Chief 
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Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, a Louisiana case, is 
the most widely cited case discussing the constitutionality of ALJ 
final decision authority.114
Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, the first head of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, and a president of the ABA.  William J. Fleener, Jr., Michigan 
Lawyers in History—Thomas McIntyre Cooley: Michigan’s Most Influential 
Lawyer, ST. B. MICH.,
http://www.michbar.org/journal/article.cfm?articleID=53&volumeID=3 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013).  There is an accredited law school named in his honor based 
at Lansing, Michigan, with other campuses at Ann Arbor, Michigan; Auburn Hills, 
Michigan; Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Tampa Bay, Florida.  See Accreditation,
THOMAS M. COOLEY L. SCH., http://www.cooley.edu/about/accreditation.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
114 There are two earlier, less publicized state court decisions upholding 
the constitutionality of final decision authority for state central panel ALJs under 
constitutions of their states.  See Rossi, Final Orders on Appeal, supra note 3, at 
10.  Rossi writes in part, “At least one state, Florida, has held that final authority by 
an ALJ located in a central panel does not violate state separation of powers 
doctrine.”  Id. Rossi identifies Florida Department of State v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 
290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), as that case.  Id. at 11.  Rossi’s comment that the 
court was not presented with and hence did not consider some of the strongest 
arguments against constitutionality is immaterial.  The court decided the issue 
notwithstanding that Rossi believes he has stronger arguments than the one the 
court actually ruled on.  The court decision will stand as the law of the state of 
Florida unless it is overruled in a later case.  See also MARY SHUPING, N.C. GEN.
ASSEM. RESEARCH DIV., CONTESTED CASES UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE APA:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION & OPINIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OAH
FINAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY 11–50 (2000).  As part of the material she 
assembled in this document, Ms. Shuping includes a legal opinion by North 
Carolina General Assembly Staff Attorney Karen Cochrane Brown.  Id. at 14.  Ms. 
Brown’s opinion, The Constitutionality of House Bill 968, reads in part, “[T]he 
precise question . . . [concerning the constitutionality of delegating final decision 
authority to a central panel ALJ without agency review subject to an appeal to the 
courts] has been definitively answered by the [North Carolina] Court of Appeals.”  
Id. at 16.  Ms. Brown cites Employment Security Commission of North Carolina v. 
Peace, 493 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997), as the court of appeals case that 
decided the issue.  The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed this constitutional 
issue as a discretionary appeal issue on which the North Carolina Supreme Court 
had improvidently granted the appeal.  The North Carolina Supreme Court did not 
hold that the North Carolina Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to rule on 
the constitutional issue.  Further, the court of appeals ruled on the issue in its 
opinion in Employment Security Commission, 493 S.E.2d at 470–71.  When a 
higher court dismisses an appeal on non-substantive grounds, the decision of the 
lower court (here the court of appeals) stands.  I agree with Professor Rossi and 
Ms. Brown’s reading of these two cases as deciding the final decision authority 
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The Louisiana Supreme Court was relatively straightforward 
in its treatment of constitutional issues in Wooley.115 Wooley holds 
that: (1) no specific powers or authority are granted to or conferred 
on the Insurance Commissioner by the Louisiana constitution; and, 
therefore, (2) the Louisiana legislature could freely transfer final 
decision authority in an agency adjudication from one executive 
branch agency (the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner) to another 
executive branch agency (the Louisiana Central Panel).116
Wooley strongly suggests that the legislation would have been 
unconstitutional if: (3) the Louisiana constitution had conferred 
specific authority on the Insurance Commissioner (which it did not); 
and (4) the Louisiana legislature had enacted legislation purporting to 
transfer a portion of the authority conferred on the Insurance 
Commissioner by the Louisiana constitution to the central panel ALJ 
(which the Wooley court determined that the legislature did not 
do).117
In Wooley, the Louisiana Supreme Court was not suggesting a 
statute transferring final decision authority away from a line agency 
to a central panel ALJ would violate the constitutionally required 
separation of powers except as indicated in paragraphs (3) and (4) 
above.  
There are several law review articles which speculate about
the possibility that a state court might find that transferring final 
decision authority from a line agency to a central panel ALJ would be 
unconstitutional as an intrusion on “core executive branch functions” 
of the executive. 118 However, none of these articles clearly 
articulates the reasoning behind this speculation.  
constitutional issue in the states of Florida and North Carolina unless and until the 
cases are overturned.
115 See Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d. 746, 761–
72 (La. 2005).
116 See id. at 767–68.
117 See id.
118 See Jay S. Bybee, supra note 32, at 462–63; Flanagan, Redefining the 
Role, supra note 3, at 1410–11; Rossi, Final Orders On Appeal, supra note 3, at 2 
(“Although there are many benefits to ALJ finality . . . it also risks undermining 
core executive branch functions and thwarting accountability norms.”); Moliterno, 
supra note 3, at 1227 n.181.
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Professors James F. Flanagan and Jim Rossi have been two of 
the leading proponents of retaining final decision authority in the 
agency instead of allowing all or part of it to be exercised by central 
panel ALJs.  As stated earlier, the late John Hardwicke was the first 
chief ALJ and director of the Maryland OAH.119 He was also the 
first executive director of NAALJ and was a leading proponent of 
central panel authority.  In a debate between Judge Hardwicke and 
Professors Flanagan and Rossi at the 2004 annual meeting of the 
ABA in Atlanta, Georgia on the final decision issue (in which 
Professors Flanagan and Rossi were presumably marshaling their 
strongest arguments) neither Professor Rossi nor Professor Flanagan 
brought up the issue of the possible unconstitutionality of ALJ final 
decision authority. 120 In his article, Final, but Often Fallible: 
Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, Professor Rossi alludes to 
the constitutional argument, but then concedes that legislation 
transferring final decision authority to central panel ALJs could be 
drafted to avoid any constitutional problem.121
Key to the constitutional arguments is the notion of separate 
branches of government.  Although invasion of the core functions of 
the three branches of government is at least a theoretical problem in 
state administrative law, the doctrine has not been well developed in 
interpretation of state constitutions.122 It has been developed most 
coherently at the federal level.123
One of the better articles to discuss the required separation of 
core functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in 
federal administrative agencies is Presidential Administration by 
119 See supra note *.
120 See Jim Flanagan, Jim Rossi, John Hardwicke, & Tyrone T. Butler, 
NCALJ Panel Discussion: ALJ Decisions—Final or Fallible?, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 191 (2005).  This debate took place in the Georgia Office of 
State Administrative Hearings during the 2004 ABA meeting in Atlanta, Georgia.  
See id. at 191.
121 Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible, supra note 3, at 64.
122 For articles on the doctrine under state law, see Johnny C. Burris, The 
Administrative Process and Constitutional Principles: Separation of Powers, 75 
FLA. B. J. 28 (2012); David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California 
Constitutional Law: Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655 (2011); and 
Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1337 (1990).
123 See infra notes 124–130 and accompanying text.
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Associate Justice Elena Kagan of the U.S. Supreme Court.124 Justice 
Kagan wrote the article as a visiting professor at Harvard Law School 
following her service under President Bill Clinton as Associate 
General Counsel, then as a Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy, 
and Deputy Director of the Domestic Policy Council.125 Although 
she sees a definite role for the President in the supervision and 
direction of federal agencies in rulemaking, she does not view the 
President’s core authority as including any right to intervene in 
administrative adjudication.126 Justice Kagan explained:
[My] analysis with respect to adjudications, however, 
is fundamentally different [from her analysis of 
presidential authority to direct agency rulemaking], 
reflecting the different nature of these administrative 
proceedings and the different purposes of participation 
in them.  The famous, now always paired cases of 
Londoner v. Denver and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. 
State Board of Equalization drew the constitutional 
line of division, requiring notice and a hearing as a 
matter of due process when an administrative 
authority resolves disputes involving particular and 
identifiable parties, but not when it adopts rules of 
general application.  The APA maintained the 
distinction, imposing much stricter procedural 
requirements on agencies when they act through 
adjudicative than through rulemaking processes. . . . 
[T]he greater impetus behind the distinction comes 
from a sense that the participation of an affected party 
serves special values in adjudicative proceedings . . .  
[I]n these proceedings, which apply to and affect 
discrete individuals and firms, participation not only 
provides needed information to the decision maker, 
but also ensures fundamental fairness and protection 
124 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245 (2001).
125 See id. at 2246 n.*; see also Biography of Current Justices of the 
Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
126 See Kagan, supra note 124, at 2306, 2362–63.
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against abuse, and thereby promotes the acceptability 
of decisions.
In this context, presidential participation in 
administration, of whatever form, would contravene 
procedural norms and inject an inappropriate influence 
into the resolution of controversies. . . . [As] the 
Supreme Court stated in Myers v. United States:
“there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character 
imposed on executive officers and members of 
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing 
affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which 
the President can not in a particular case properly 
influence or control.” . . .  The consequence here is to 
disallow the President from disrupting or displacing 
the procedural, participatory requirements associated 
with agency adjudication . . . .127
A recent law review article by Professor Jamelle C. Sharp 
says that, similarly, Congress is strictly prohibited from interfering 
with individual cases undergoing agency adjudication.128
The same points made by Justice Kagan and Professor Sharpe 
are also made by Charles H. Koch: 
[P]olitical actors have a role in the 
administrative process.  To a large extent the role is 
legitimate and positive.  However, there are some 
limits on the amount and kind of influence which will 
be permissible.  In agency adjudications of individual 
cases or controversies where the agency is performing 
its “judicial” or “quasi-judicial” role, influence from 
the legislative or executive branch is considered 
127 Id. at 2362–63 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing 
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
128 Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 183, 198 (2013).
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improper because it threatens procedural rights of the 
individual litigants.129
Quasi-judicial administrative adjudications are thus not 
subject to control by either the executive or legislative branches of 
government.130
A student article by Asher P. Spiller expresses the view that 
final decision authority for the North Carolina central panel violates 
the state constitution.131 Its analysis conflicts with the one presented 
here.  Spiller argues that the legislature, after making an agency 
responsible for regulation of a particular subject, could not 
constitutionally limit the agency’s authority to adjudicate regulatory 
issues.132 I did not find the argument convincing.
My own experience in Texas is relevant here.  During the 
early part of my career, I served for eight years on the Texas 
Attorney General’s staff as an Assistant Attorney General where, 
among other duties, I sometimes wrote memos or attorney general 
opinions on the constitutionality of actual or proposed state 
legislation.  I followed this employment with five years as an 
Assistant General Counsel to the Governor (where I continued to 
review the constitutionality of legislation to avoid constitutional 
problems or for possible exercise of the Governor’s veto authority).  I 
then spent approximately three years as General Counsel to the Texas 
Comptroller of Public Accounts (where I still worked with state 
constitutional issues) and a year as chief legal advisor to the Texas 
Public Utility Commission.  In these positions, I acquired a good 
basic understanding of the Texas Constitution and of how the Texas 
Governor relates to Texas state agencies and vice versa.
129 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 400 
(3d ed. 2010).
130 See id. On this same point and in agreement with the authorities cited 
above, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 622–23 (1984); Paul R. 
Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White 
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 982 (1980).
131 Asher P. Spiller, The Folly in Finality: The Constitutionality of ALJ 
Final Decision-Making Authority in North Carolina, 90 N.C. L. REV. 2162 (2012).
132 See id. at 2182.
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The Governor of Texas is chief executive of the State of 
Texas,133 but since Texas has a plural executive branch (including 
several statewide separately elected executive branch officials such 
as the Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller 
Of Public Accounts, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
the Commissioner of Agriculture, and three individually elected 
members of the Railroad Commission),134 the Texas Governor cannot 
in fact or in theory claim the power over administrative agencies that 
is sometimes claimed for the President of the United States under the 
so-called unitary executive theory.135 Quite clearly, Texas, with so 
many separately elected executive officials, has a plural, rather than a 
unitary, executive.136 I cannot imagine a Texas court holding that a 
statute was unconstitutional because it deprived a Texas governor of 
quasi-judicial authority by transferring final adjudicative decision 
authority to a central panel ALJ.  I cannot imagine a Texas governor 
even raising that contention.  If it were raised, I am confident the 
Texas courts would hold that quasi-judicial authority is not part of 
the Texas governor’s “core functions.”  While the regulatory 
agencies are located in the executive branch of state government, the 
adjudicatory functions of the agencies operate independently of both 
the governor and the legislature.  
133 See TEXAS POLITICS: THE GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_2_0.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
134 See TEXAS POLITICS: THE PLURAL EXECUTIVE, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_0.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS 
POLITICS: ATTORNEY GENERAL, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_3.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS 
POLITICS: COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_4.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS 
POLITICS: COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_5.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS 
POLITICS: COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_6.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); TEXAS 
POLITICS: RAILROAD COMMISSION, U. TEX. AUSTIN,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/1_9_8.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); see also
TEX. CONST. art. IV.
135 See TEXAS POLITICS: THE PLURAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 134
(describing the limitations of the plural executive).
136 See F. Scott McCown, Executive Orders and the Powers of the Texas 
Governor, Discussion at the 2nd Annual Advanced Texas Administrative Law 
Seminar (Aug. 30, 2007).
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While one has to be careful in assuming that all fifty state 
constitutions are alike in most of their provisions, the separation of 
powers into three separate coordinate branches of government is 
basic to the federal and to all state constitutions.137 Until shown the 
contrary, the reader should assume that all fifty states would prohibit 
their governors from directly exercising executive authority to 
control the outcome of individual adjudications.  Thus, there would 
be nothing that a governor could properly complain had been taken 
away from the powers of his or her office if final decision-making in 
the adjudicative functions of administrative agencies were transferred 
from the line agencies to central panel ALJs.  The transfer could not 
take place, of course, should it infringe on any constitutional 
authority expressly granted to individual agencies. 
Again, to draw an analogy with federal agency adjudications, 
on numerous occasions Congress has placed final decision authority 
in a separate adjudicatory agency ALJ or in a court, instead of in the 
administrative agency having primary jurisdiction to regulate the 
subject matter involved in the adjudication.138 For a comprehensive 
discussion of the situations in which this has occurred, see Daniel J. 
Gifford’s article, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of 
an Alternative Agency Structure.139
137 See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III; see also DANIEL L. GRANT & H.C.
NIXON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 144 (3d ed. 1975) (“Every 
state constitution provides for a framework of government.  In general or specific 
terms, it outlines three branches of government: legislative, executive, and 
judicial.”).
138 See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role 
of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (1990–1991).
139 See id. Gifford gives as examples, the Board of Tax Appeals, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, and the Federal Mine Safety 
and Heath Review Commission.  Id. at 982, 974–75, 1000–03, 1001.  See also the 
Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945, which departs from the usual 
APA pattern without transferring the ALJ position to a separate agency.  In 
Zimmerman v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 871 
F.2d 564, 566–67 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), the court commented on this 
as follows: 
We note in passing that our reviewing function is quite 
different under the Black Lung Benefits Act than it is under the 
Social Security Act. . . .  The statutory scheme under the Black 
Lung Benefits Act is quite different, for here Congress has 
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Professor Gifford writes that in certain federal agencies
(generally described as “mass-justice agenc[ies]”)—those with 
voluminous caseloads in which decisions are based primarily on 
factual rather than legal or policy determinations—it is physically 
impossible for the agency head to make the final decision in 
individual cases.140 In those agencies, the agency head instead sets 
policy for the cases through rulemaking. 141 This leaves the final 
decision to the ALJ, who decides the facts without agency review.142
The agency is only a litigant without any role in controlling the result 
in individual cases. 143 Professor Gifford says this structure has 
existed in some federal agencies for many years—primarily in 
benefit-granting agencies, but also in some regulatory agencies.144
These non-traditional arrangements are sometimes referred to as 
“split-enforcement model adjudication.”145
Academicians have sometimes criticized the way these non-
traditional arrangements are structured,146 but I have not located any 
expressly placed the power to make conclusive findings of fact 
with the ALJ, and limited the Board’s function to determining 
whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.  
Under this scheme we are to defer to the ALJ, not to the Board.
140 See Gifford, supra note 138, at 997–98.
141 See id. at 998.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 Id. at 988–92, 997.
145 See id. at 1000 n.104 (citing George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-
Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences,
39 ADMIN L. REV. 315 (1987)); see also George Robert Johnson, Jr., Background 
Report for Recommendation 86-4—The Split-Enforcement Model: Some 
Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, in ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 293
(1986).
146 See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 19 (1986).  This recommendation reads in part: 
An Administrative Conference study of the experience with the 
“split-enforcement model” . . . was unable to conclude whether 
this model achieves greater fairness in adjudication than does the 
traditional structural model.  Fairness is an important but an 
unquantifiable and subjective value.  Therefore, the Conference 
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arguments in law journals or elsewhere that the above arrangements 
are unconstitutional either as an infringement on the core powers of 
the President or Congress or that they are unconstitutional for other 
reasons. 
If the federal government can withhold final decision 
authority from federal agencies and place it either in separate 
administrative adjudicatory agencies or in ALJs, without raising valid 
constitutional concerns about infringement on the core authority of 
either the President or Congress (as it has done on numerous 
occasions), it is more than reasonable to assume that the states can do 
likewise.  
X. ARTICLES ADVOCATING THAT CENTRAL PANEL ALJS MAKE 
ONLY A RECOMMENDED DECISION, WITH THE AGENCY HEAD MAKING 
THE FINAL DECISION ON BOTH FACTS AND LAW
The most widely cited articles touching on the topic of final 
decision authority for central panel ALJs are James F. Flanagan, 
Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central 
Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of
Agency Review 147 (cited 43 times); James E. Moliterno, The 
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth 148 (cited 29 times); 
and Jim Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with 
takes no position on whether the split-enforcement model is 
preferable to a structure in which responsibilities for rulemaking, 
enforcement and adjudication are combined within a single 
agency.  Our study did reveal, however, that because Congress 
[in setting up the split-enforcement model], did not specify 
clearly the . . . responsibilities of [the different agencies 
involved] in resolving questions of law and policy, unnecessary 
conflicts have arisen between the agencies and there has been 
confusion expressed by reviewing courts over which agency’s 
views were entitled to the greater deference.
Id.
147 Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3.  Professor Flanagan wrote 
a second article opposing central panel ALJ final decision authority entitled, An 
Update on Developments in Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority. See 
Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3 (cited 15 times).
148 Moliterno, supra note 3.
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ALJ Finality149 (cited 16 times).  I will begin my discussion of these 
articles with a discussion of Professor Moliterno’s article.150
A. Moliterno’s Article, The Administrative Judiciary’s 
Independence Myth
For purposes of this paper, I am defining “decisional 
independence” as, “the ability of an ALJ to reach a final decision in 
each case based solely on the evidence of record, the matters of 
which official notice may properly be taken, and the applicable law 
without undue pressure or interference from the agency or any 
outside parties.”  As indicated below, the case law and the academic 
and professional commentaries support the independence of ALJs 
using this definition. 151 This is not the definition of ALJ 
independence that Professor Moliterno uses.  His definition revolves 
around final decision authority only.  Professor Moliterno asserts that 
ALJs lack independence because the agency, in most jurisdictions, 
may overrule the ALJ’s recommended decision and reach other 
conclusions both on factual and legal issues.152
The article ALJ Independence and Final Order Authority, by 
David Marcus, contains an excellent response to this assertion.153
ALJ Marcus writes, in part: 
[T]hese issues are not concerns for ALJ independence; 
rather, they are concerns about fairness and the 
appearance of fairness in the agency’s final order 
decision process.  
149 Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible, supra note 3.  Professor Rossi wrote 
an earlier version of Final, but Often Fallible.  It is entitled, ALJ Final Orders On 
Appeal: Balancing Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDICIARY 1 (1999) (cited 12 times).  
150 See infra Part X.A.
151 See infra notes 153–167 and accompanying text.
152 See Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1224–25.
153 See David Marcus, ALJ Independence and the Issue of Final Order 
Authority, ADMIN. L. NEWSL. (Or. State Bar, Admin. Law Section, Tigard, Or.), 
Winter 2009, at 1, 2, available at
http://osbadmin.homestead.com/files/newsletters/AdminNL_Winter_09.pdf.
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As an ALJ who has conducted contested case 
hearings involving a variety of agencies, I have held 
numerous cases in which I was authorized to issue a 
final order, and numerous other cases in which I was 
authorized only to issue a proposed order, with the 
agency involved reserving its authority to issue the 
final order.  In my view, the independence of an ALJ 
is not affected by the decisional authority delegated to 
the ALJ in the case.  
The “independence” of the ALJ is related to 
the conduct of the hearing—to develop a full record—
and to the preparation of the ALJ’s order based solely 
on that record.154
Based on my own twenty years of experience as an ALJ and 
hearing officer in Texas, I think ALJ David Marcus is absolutely 
correct.  In over twenty years as an ALJ, I had both cases in which I 
had final decision authority and cases in which I had authority only to 
make a recommended decision.  Whether I had final decision 
authority or authority only to make a recommended decision made 
little difference in how I handled the case, except that I probably 
spent a little less time on a recommended decision than a final one, 
since the hearing rules under which I practiced required anyone 
appealing my decision to the agency head to file exceptions with me 
before the exceptions went to the agency head.  This gave me a 
chance to amend the recommended decision if, on reading the 
exceptions, I considered some of them to be well taken or to expose 
ambiguities in my explanation of the decision that needed correction.  
Professor Moliterno begins his article by stating that 
administrative law is not his field, but is a field to which he has only 
recently been introduced by Professor Charles H. Koch, Jr. 155
Professor Moliterno’s article adopts a position against central panel 
ALJ final decision authority.156 His arguments rest primarily on the 
154 Id.
155 See Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1191 n.*.
156 See id. at 1230–31.
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Flanagan and Rossi law review articles,157 but Professor Moliterno 
builds his position through a series of arguments, which are flawed 
and demonstrably incorrect.
The most critical flaw is the most basic: Professor 
Moliterno’s main thesis as stated in his title is that ALJs lack—and 
are intended to lack—independence from the agencies they work 
for. 158 If this were true, the administrative adjudication process 
would be a sham with pre-ordained results.  Fortunately, the weight 
of authority is overwhelmingly against Professor Moliterno’s 
conclusion that ALJs lack independence.159
In Butz v. Economou,160 a 5–4 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Associate Justice Byron R. White addressed the ALJ 
independence issue and held that federal ALJs clearly have 
decisional independence free from improper influence by their host 
agencies.161 Justice White stated this view, in which he was joined 
by a majority of the court, as follows:
[T]he process of agency adjudication is currently 
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner 
exercises his independent judgment on the evidence 
before him, free from pressures by the parties or other 
officials within the agency. . . . [T]he Administrative 
Procedure Act contains a number of provisions 
designed to guarantee the independence of hearing 
examiners.  They may not perform duties inconsistent 
with their duties as hearing examiners.  When 
conducting a hearing under § 5 of the APA, a hearing 
examiner is not responsible to, or subject to the 
supervision or direction of, employees or agents 
engaged in the performance of investigative or 
prosecution functions for the agency.  Nor may a 
157 See id. at 1191 n.2, 1225 n.173, 1226 n.179, 1226–27, 1227 n.181, 
1227 n.182, 1228 n.189, 1229 n.198, 1229–30, 1230 n.200, 1230 nn.202–03, 1231 
n.206, 1233 n.212.
158 See id. at 1191, 1192.
159 See infra notes 160–167 and accompanying text.
160 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
161 See id. at 513–14.
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hearing examiner consult any person or party, 
including other agency officials, concerning a fact at 
issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity 
for all parties to participate. Hearing examiners must 
be assigned to cases in rotation so far as is 
practicable.  They may be removed only for good 
cause established and determined by the Civil Service 
Commission . . . .162
Also disagreeing with Professor Moliterno, in an exhaustive 
study of the federal ALJ position for the Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS), some of our leading administrative law 
academics, Professors Paul R. Verkuil, Daniel J. Gifford, Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, and Professor Moliterno’s mentor, 
Charles H. Koch, Jr., wrote: “In short, ALJs are very nearly as 
independent of federal agencies as federal trial judges are of the 
executive branch.  This high degree of independence of ALJs from 
agencies is designed to protect the rights of individuals affected by 
agency adjudicatory decisions from any potential source of bias.”163
Also at odds with Professor Moliterno’s conclusion that ALJs 
lack independence is the ABA Section of Administrative Law and 
Regulatory Practice’s A Guide to Federal Agency Adjudication,
which states in part: “Improper interference with ALJ performance 
includes interference with the writing of opinions or interference with 
the way in which an ALJ conducts hearings.  Courts have held that 
the decisional independence of the administrative judiciary is 
constitutionally protected.”164
162 Id. (citations omitted).
163 Verkuil, Gifford, Koch, Pierce, & Lubbers, supra note 39, at 982; see 
also KOCH, supra note 129, at 62 (“Presiding officials who are designated ALJs 
have a special status established and protection by the APA.  Although ALJs do not 
have the status of Article III judges, their independence is firmly established and 
accepted.”).
164 AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW AND REGULATORY 
PRACTICE, A GUIDE to FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 176–77 (Michael 
Asimow ed., 2003) (footnotes omitted) (citing Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 
603–08 (6th Cir. 2000); Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark. 
1999)); see also Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J.
NAT'L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 321 (2002).  Such well-thought-of 
administrative adjudicators as Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Senior ALJ of the Colorado 
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Professor Moliterno has simply redefined the term 
“independence” to place ALJs outside his definition and has ignored 
the fact that the term has been used almost universally by the courts, 
academics, and the organized bar to describe ALJs.  His contention 
that ALJs lack independence made a catchy title for his law review 
article, but Professor Moliterno’s arguments in support of his thesis 
clearly will not stand up to analysis.  
Professor William S. Jordan, III has also drawn this 
conclusion. 165 In his article, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An 
Unintended Combination, Professor Jordan writes that,  
James Moliterno insists that ALJs are impartial as a 
result of the APA’s provisions but that they are not 
independent . . . .  In administrative law parlance, 
however, they are generally considered to be 
independent, particularly because their salaries and
positions are protected and because the APA requires 
separation of the functions of investigation and 
prosecution from the ALJ’s function of decision.  
Moliterno is correct that the agency controls policy, 
but the ALJ is both independent and impartial in
factual decisions.166
Another flaw in Professor Moliterno’s arguments appears 
where he writes:
Although administrative judges are not 
required to follow precedent, they are required to 
Office of Administrative Courts and Adjunct Professor at the University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law, and AJ Ann Marshall Young of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission have also written on the decisional independence of ALJs.  See Edwin 
L. Felter, Jr., Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right and 
Wrong Kind, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 19, 26 (2010); Ann Marshall 
Young, Judicial Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Past, Present, and 
Future, 19 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 101, 117 (1999).  The Felter and 
Marshall Young articles cannot be reconciled with Professor Moliterno’s view that 
administrative law judges lack independence.
165 See William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An 
Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 251 n.7 (2009).
166 Id. (citation omitted).
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make their decisions impartially based on factors 
outside of their own senses of proper agency policy.  
Clearly, administrative judges must follow the 
agency’s legislative rules, but, perhaps more 
controversially with some administrative judges, they 
must also follow other statements or indicators of 
agency policy.167
Professor Moliterno’s statement above about ALJs not 
following precedent and not being required to follow statements or 
indicators of agency policy other than properly promulgated rules is 
incorrect.  
1. Moliterno’s statement that ALJs do not follow precedent
The treatise by Frank E. Cooper, State Administrative Law,
correctly summarizes the common practice of state and federal 
agencies with regard to following their own precedents.168 Cooper 
writes: 
[I]t can fairly be said that administrative agencies act 
very much the same as do the courts, so far as 
concerns their respect for precedents.  An agency may 
consider as settled a question recently decided by it, 
for the very reason that a precedent exists.  At the 
same time, as do the courts, agencies distinguish and
in appropriate instances overrule their own precedents.  
The colorful phrase of Judge Wyzanski, who 
remarked “The administrator is expected to treat 
experience not as a jailer but as a teacher,” can be 
applied equally to the courts and to the state agencies.
This approach to precedent has evolved with the 
increasing maturity of the agencies.  It was long 
assumed that there was but little room to apply the 
167 Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1199 (footnote omitted) (citing Charles H. 
Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 
695–96 (2005)).
168 See FRANK E. COOPER, 2 STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 530–31 (1965).
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doctrine of stare decisis to determinations of 
administrative agencies; they were not expected to 
apply fixed or unvarying rules or policies; but to 
exercise discretion and ingenuity in working out a 
satisfactory solution for each new case.  Further, it 
was generally conceived that since the announcement 
of a decision by an agency did not establish a rule of 
law but represented rather an ad hoc determination, 
the foundations of the doctrine of stare decisis (which 
were deeply rooted in the notion that the law was 
unchanging) did not square with the theory of 
administrative adjudication. 
. . . .
However, many agencies, motivated in part no 
doubt by practical considerations and arguments of 
convenience, have adopted the practice of relying 
heavily on their decisions in former cases.  As long 
ago as 1941, the Attorney General’s Committee on 
Administrative Procedure found that “in almost every 
instance the agencies’ officers who were interviewed 
expressed the belief that they accorded to the 
precedents of their respective agencies as much 
weight as is thought to be given by the highest court 
of a state to its own prior decisions.”169
2. Moliterno’s assertion that ALJs are required to follow 
statements or indicators of agency policy other than properly 
promulgated rules
In his classic work, Manual For Administrative Law Judges,
retired ALJ Merritt Ruhlen has summarized the law on the 
requirement that AJs follow an agency’s legislative rules and other 
statements or indicators of agency policy, as follows: 
169 Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Shawmut Ass’n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 
796 (1st Cir. 1945); OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 466 (Gov’t 
Printing Office 1941), available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/pdfdownload/1941appendixM.pdf (last 
visited July 22, 2013)).
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The cornerstone of the formal administrative 
process is the principle that the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge is an independent 
intellectual judgment, based solely upon the 
applicable laws (including agency regulations and 
precedent) and the facts contained in the record.  This 
has several consequences.  
The Judge should not consider public or 
private statements of agency members or heads, 
Congressmen, or congressional committees.  The only 
non-record pronouncements of government officials 
relevant to his decision are official and operative
pronouncements: not policy statements by the agency 
members but agency rules and decisions; not speeches 
by administration officials but current Executive 
Orders; not comments by Congressmen or 
congressional committees but statutes of present 
effect.  It is not fair to expect the parties to answer 
contentions not of record.  Moreover, most such 
contentions, however high the source, are made 
without benefit of the factual information developed at 
the hearing.
A few words are necessary concerning the 
relationship which the decision should bear to the 
established policies of the agency.  It is the Judge’s 
duty to decide all cases in accordance with agency 
policy.  Even when court decisions (other than those 
of the Supreme Court) have found the agency’s 
position to be erroneous, he is bound to apply the 
agency view if the agency has authoritatively declared 
its nonacquiesence in the decisions.  However, if the 
parties have introduced evidence or arguments, not 
previously considered by the agency which tend to 
show that established policy should be changed, the 
Judge should consider such contentions and if he is 
convinced he should so find.
This is not to suggest that the Judge should 
seek to divine that result which the current 
membership of the agency will approve.  His 
524 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
responsibility is to follow established agency policy.  
To attempt to predict future votes would be an 
abdication of his proper role.  The whole purpose of 
the Judge’s decision is to give the agency the benefit 
of his judgment after a proceeding specifically 
designed to elicit the truth of the matter; nothing 
whatever is gained if he seeks to set before the agency 
members instead only a mirror of their own thoughts, 
no matter how obtained.  For this reason the Judge’s 
decision should not be swayed by any tentative 
finding of fact or conclusion of law or policy 
contained in an order of investigation, an order to 
show cause, or any other action by which the agency 
has indicated how it is thinking.
Agency staff’s view should be subjected to the 
same impartial scrutiny as the views of any other 
interested person.  There is no room for a presumption 
that the staff position is superior because it is put 
forward as an objective, untainted furthering of the 
“public interest”.  It is the Judge’s job to decide where 
the public interest lies, and the theory of the system 
presumes that this is best achieved by impartial 
evaluation of all facts and arguments on their 
merits.170
When he directly addresses the subject of the finality of an 
ALJ decision, Professor Moliterno first cites the applicable section of 
the federal APA for the proposition that the agency, not the ALJ, has 
final decision authority.171 Of course, the federal APA has no direct 
bearing on whether a particular state central panel ALJ has final 
decision authority.172 A person must look instead to the state APA or 
sometimes to the organic state statute governing the particular agency 
170 MERRITT RUHLEN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 66–68 (1st ed. 1974).
171 Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1224 (citing federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2000)).
172 See supra Part VIII (discussing the fact that individual state APAs and 
enabling acts (rather than the federal APA) govern state administrative 
adjudication).
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to determine whether a central panel ALJ does or does not have final 
decision authority in a particular case.173 The federal APA applies 
only to federal agencies.  State agencies are subject to state APAs 
and enabling acts for each agency—not to the federal APA.174
Professor Moliterno next argues that, “Administrative judges . 
. . exist in order to further the policies of the executive branch, 
specifically the agency for which they judge, through the impartial 
adjudication of disputes.  Allowing administrative judges final 
authority over policy and perhaps even over fact findings, however, 
would thwart that end.”175
Professor Moliterno’s statement that ALJs exist to further the 
policies of the executive branch is a misstatement.  The ALJ’s proper 
role is as a neutral.  It is to make certain both sides to the case receive 
a fair hearing, not to further the mission or policies of an 
administrative agency—except insofar as the agency proves those 
policies have been properly promulgated—and to apply the properly 
promulgated agency policies and the law to the facts in the case 
before the ALJ. Stated another way, the ALJ’s intended role is not to 
have either a pro or anti-agency bias, but to confront every case with 
an open mind.  The ALJ’s role is to fully and fairly analyze the facts 
and legal arguments presented and to decide each case based on the 
record, according to the rule of law, to the best of the ALJ’s ability.  
The ALJ’s job, like the job of any other judge, is to “call balls and 
strikes and not to pitch or to bat.”176 Indeed, under the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, this neutral role of the ALJ is 
constitutionally required.177
On the issue of ALJ finality, Professor Moliterno primarily 
adopts the arguments of Professors Flanagan and Rossi.  He writes:
173 See supra Part VIII.
174 Id.
175 Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1226.
176 John Roberts, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Opening Statement 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee During Nomination Hearings (Sept. 12, 2005) 
(stating the proper role of a judge), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/.
177 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (finding that “an impartial decision maker is 
essential.”).
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Flanagan argues that granting final authority [to ALJs] 
“will significantly alter state contested case 
adjudication by creating inconsistencies between the 
agencies’ articulated policies and the results achieved 
through contested case litigation and will adversely 
affect the agency’s enforcement of its statutory 
mandate.”
. . . .
. . . Such authority is irreconcilable with their role as 
an executive judiciary . . . .178
In a footnote, Professor Moliterno quotes Professor Rossi, 
writing: “‘ALJ finality . . . risks undermining core executive branch 
functions and thwarting accountability norms.’  Indeed, Rossi even 
questions the constitutionality of the idea. . . .  ‘[T]he cases are 
decidedly unhelpful in addressing whether delegation of final order 
authority to an ALJ outside of a politically accountable agency is 
constitutional.’”179
Switching back to his main text, Professor Moliterno notes 
that, “furthermore, there is reliable evidence that . . . [ALJ final 
decision authority] will produce uncertainty in the law and a loss in 
accountability, and will nullify agency experience in applying the law 
and agency discretion in applying its own rules.”180
In another footnote, Professor Moliterno adds:
Flanagan defends these views extensively and ably, 
and his article has never received an adequate 
response from anyone of an opposing outlook.  His 
final conclusion—that “the executive department has 
lost some of its ability to enforce the law,” because of 
ALJ finality—is another cogent and unanswered 
178 Moliterno, supra note 3, at 1226–27 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3, at 1362).
179 Id. at 1227 n.181 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Rossi, Final Orders on Appeal, supra note 3, at 2, 10 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
180 Id. at 1227.
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argument in favor of continuing the present system of 
agency review.181
Recognizing that “an adequate response” is in the eye of the 
beholder, as a person of an opposing outlook, I will respond to the 
arguments of both Professor Flanagan and Professor Rossi in the next 
two subsections of this paper.182 However, before I respond, I must 
take issue with Professor Moliterno’s assertion that their arguments 
have gone unanswered or have not been adequately responded to 
previously.  John Hardwicke, retired Chief ALJ of the Maryland 
OAH, debated Professors Flanagan and Rossi on the central panel 
ALJ final decision issue in 2004. 183 Many who either heard the 
debate or read the transcript thought that Judge Hardwicke clearly 
won the debate.  I will discuss some of his key points in more detail 
below.
Further, there are several articles supporting final decision 
authority for ALJs that predate the articles of Professors Flanagan 
and Rossi to which neither have ever responded.  These articles 
include Richard M. Hluchan, Administrative Adjudication in New 
Jersey: Why Not Let the ALJ Decide? 184 Mr. Hluchan argues 
persuasively that allowing the agency to change the outcome of a 
recommended neutral central panel ALJ decision is unfair to the 
private litigant and unnecessarily runs up costs for both the state and 
the private litigant.185 He also argues that it unnecessarily delays the 
181 Id. at 1227 n.182 (citation omitted) (quoting Flanagan, Redefining the 
Role, supra note 3 at 1410).
182 See infra Part X.B–C.
183 See Flanagan, Rossi, Hardwicke & Butler, supra note 120.
184 Richard M. Hluchan, Administrative Adjudications in New Jersey: Why 
Not Let the ALJ Decide?, N.J. LAW, Oct./Nov. 1996, at 28, reprinted in 33 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 560 (2013).  This article is being reprinted at my 
request as an example of law review articles supporting final decision authority for 
central panel ALJs.  Although these articles exist, they have appeared primarily in 
journals of limited circulation and have been written as advocacy pieces in an 
attempt to influence lawmakers in the jurisdictions in which the articles appear.  To 
my knowledge, none of them have previously been run in law journals with a 
national circulation.
185 Id.; see also Testimony of Red Tape Review Group Hearing, Richard 
M. Hluchan et al. (Mar. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Testimony to Red Tape Review 
Group], available at
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time it would otherwise take to get to an appellate court for review.186
Professor Flanagan cites the Hluchan article but does not discuss it in 
http://www.nj.gov/governor/news/reports/pdf/20100302_rtg.pdf (last visited Nov. 
22, 2013) (supporting ALJ final decision authority for the New Jersey Central 
Panel before the New Jersey Governor’s Red Tape Review Group).  Mr. Hluchan 
testified, in part:
In addition to being a matter of fundamental fairness and 
due process, the current system is really inefficient.  It costs more 
money than is necessary, it consumes more staff time than is 
necessary, and it adds additional time, all of which is 
unnecessary.
We have the commissioner essentially doing a 
redundant review of the ALG’s [sic] decision.  And, of course, 
when we say the Commissioner, we know the commissioner does 
not personally review every one of these and write a decision and 
review the transcript, and so forth.  It’s the staff that we’re 
talking about that do that.  
So if we eliminate this redundant review you free up 
staff to do more important things.  You don’t have the cost of the 
redundant review and you don’t have, from the point of view of 
both sides, the additional time that’s consumed.
Id. at 39–40. 
186 Id; see also Testimony to Red Tape Review Group, supra note 185, at 
91–92.  Mr. Joseph Morano, former chair of the Administrative Law Section of the 
State Bar of New Jersey, testified in favor of central panel ALJ final decision 
authority.  His hearing testimony transcript is as follows: 
One of the things you also need to look at . . . [when] the 
administrative law judge . . . issues an initial decision [and] 
the agency reviews, there’s the period of exceptions where 
one party may say I disagree with the ALJ’s decision for the 
following reason . . . .
. . . . 
. . . [In many] of these cases we have [attorneys from] large 
firms representing towns, school districts, counties, also 
private entities . . . .  Attorneys don’t do this for free. . . . [This 
cost is in addition to the cost for whoever] at the agency . . . is 
reviewing it.  [T]hat’s a whole other level of cost . . . .
. . . . 
It’s more expensive, it’s time-intensive, and it takes a long 
time.  So that maybe makes parties on both sides think a little
bit about what they are going to do [before just automatically 
appealing a decision they disagree with to the New Jersey 
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any depth.187 Instead, his only comment on the Hluchan article is 
that, “Citizen frustration at the power of agencies to overturn the 
ALJ’s decision after the ALJ and the parties have invested substantial 
time and effort in presenting the case and obtained a favorable result 
is understandable and extensive.”188
Professors Flanagan and Rossi have also failed to respond to 
Robert S. Lorch’s Administrative Court via the Independent Hearing 
Officer, where Professor Lorch argues that state agency heads, many 
of whom are without legal training, lack the legal expertise to 
overrule central panel ALJ adjudicatory decisions; therefore, they 
should not have final decision authority. 189 Professor Lorch also 
wrote a book, Democratic Process and Administrative Law, in which 
he makes essentially the same argument as he did in the previously-
mentioned article: 
So long as hearing-officer decisions are only 
recommendations, administrative adjudication will 
continue to display some terribly questionable 
practices as a consequence.  Many agency heads who 
now have adjudicatory power are not lawyers: the 
members of a state board of barber examiners, for 
example. . . .  The question whether an agency head is 
or is not a lawyer is significant partly because in 
administrative adjudication the rules of evidence are 
relaxed and legal training is useful to handle and 
assess the great junk yard of evidence that sometimes 
piles up in an administrative hearing.190
courts].
Id.
187 See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3, at 1386 n.136.
188 Id. at 1386 (citing Hluchan, supra note 185, at 28).
189 See Robert S. Lorch, Administrative Court via the Independent 
Hearing Officer, 51 JUDICATURE 114, 118 (1967).
190 See ROBERT S. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS & ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 211 (1969); see also John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: 
Problems, Solution, and Ethical Considerations, 2 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 17 (2000) 
(taking an opposite position to Professor Flanagan’s position on almost every issue 
that Professor Flanagan discusses).
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B. The Flanagan Articles
In his original article on Central Panel ALJ Final Decision 
Authority, Professor Flanagan states the following:
The core argument for agency review is that 
the legislature delegated to the agency the 
responsibility for enforcing a particular 
comprehensive statutory scheme, including the 
development and application of legislative policy 
through regulations.  Contested cases often raise 
important policy questions that could not have been 
anticipated, are not covered by the regulations, or are 
created by the complexity of the case.  Moreover, the 
agency has institutional experience and expertise in 
the application of the statute that makes it the 
appropriate final decisionmaker.  Agency review of 
contested cases also provides greater consistency in 
decisionmaking so that factually similar cases are 
decided the same way, at least when they are decided 
at or about the same time.  In addition, agencies are 
politically accountable for the results of their 
regulation, but ALJs in independent central panels 
adjudicating individual cases, are accountable only for 
the decision in each case heard.  ALJs are not 
accountable for insuring that the decision meshes with 
other decisions or the cumulative impact of the 
decisions by all ALJs.191
Professor Flanagan returned to these themes and the other 
themes of his first article in a second article published three years 
after the first article.  In this second article, Professor Flanagan 
writes:
191 Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 3, at 1399 (footnotes 
omitted).
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[D]ebate over ALJ finality has moved to a more 
sophisticated level as experience has been gained with 
this issue.  This Article probes some of the arguments 
in favor of ALJ finality, including the need for ALJ 
independence, the claims that agencies misuse their 
review powers, and the need to address litigant 
dissatisfaction with administrative adjudication.  In 
my opinion, neither ALJ independence nor the central 
panel concept requires ALJ finality.  Data from an 
extensive study in North Carolina indicates that 
agency review is not being abused, nor will ALJ 
finality cure litigant dissatisfaction.
Finally, proposals have been advanced to 
address some of the adverse consequences of ALJ 
finality.  Some suggest that the agency should present 
its policies during the contested case to ensure that 
ALJs act in conformity with it.192
With respect to the suggestion that the agency present its 
policies to the ALJ during the course of the hearing, Flanagan argues:
The major disadvantage of ALJ finality is the 
inevitable differences in policy and enforcement that 
occur when the agency is responsible for enforcement, 
but the final decision on any action is made by the 
ALJ.  This has occurred in the few federal agencies 
with split-enforcement models, as well as the more 
recent experience in Louisiana, where the ALJ makes 
the final agency decision without any agency review.  
There are procedures for identifying important policy 
192 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 403 (footnote omitted).  
Professor Flanagan relies on Professor Daye’s study of cases in North Carolina to 
support his argument that the agencies are not abusing their final decision 
authority.  See id. at 403 n.9 (citing Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law 
Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 1571 (2001)).  But Professor Flanagan’s interpretation of Professor Daye’s 
study draws inferences from the data that Professor Daye himself never drew.  
Flanagan claims the study shows that agencies are not abusing their authority.  See 
id. at 403.  Professor Daye never claims this.
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issues before the hearing.  Can the problem of 
inconsistent decision-making be addressed by having 
the agency present its policy during the contested case 
so that the final ALJ decision will incorporate the 
agency’s policy and enforcement view?  For several 
reasons, I do not believe so.193
Before continuing with Professor Flanagan’s explanation of 
why he thinks presenting agency policy on the record during the 
course of the hearing will not work, let us look briefly at what others 
have said on this subject.
In 2005, the late Professor Charles H. Koch, Jr., author of a 
five-volume treatise on Administrative Law—now in its third edition 
and still current through its pocket parts—wrote on making agency 
policy part of the record as follows:  
Policy in adjudication requires that the facts compiled 
in the hearing-level record adequately support policy 
determinations and the justification for those 
decisions.  In the end, the administrative judges must 
be responsible for the adequacy of the record for this 
purpose.  Fortunately, administrative law permits 
administrative adjudicators to actively participate in 
the development of the record. 
Adjudication decides individual rights or 
duties, consequently it focuses on facts related to the 
specific dispute, “adjudicative facts,” and its 
procedures are designed to serve this purpose.  
Policymaking requires the development of more 
general or societal facts, called “legislative facts.”  An 
agency needs legislative facts to support and justif 
[sic] its policy conclusions.  Obviously, the power to 
identify and find those facts constitutes a considerable 
part of the power to make policy. . . . 
Flexible application of the traditional 
evidentiary rules permitted in many administrative 
193 Id. at 426–27 (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
2001.058(c) (West 2001); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11425.60 (West Supp. 2000)).
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adjudicative settings might go some distance to 
facilitate a policymaking record. . . .  Evidence clearly 
relevant to a policy question, even if tangential to the 
specific dispute, might then be admitted as relevant to 
the general resolution of the controversy.194
Professor Koch suggests that, in addition to freely allowing 
the parties to present expert testimony to establish agency policy and 
present necessary evidence on technical issues, the policymaking 
record may be built through official, administrative, or judicial 
notice, but that before an ALJ takes official, administrative, or 
judicial notice of a fact, the ALJ should offer the parties an 
opportunity for presentation of alternative evidence.195 In support of 
his assertion that the ALJ may build the policymaking record without 
formal presentation of evidence through taking official, 
administrative, or judicial notice of facts, Professor Koch quotes the 
following language from the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in the case 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.: “[I]t is well established that, as long as a 
party has an opportunity to respond, an administrative agency may 
take official notice of such ‘legislative facts’ within its special
knowledge, and is not confined to the evidence in the record in 
reaching its expert judgment.”196
According to Professor Koch, there is no good reason why an 
agency cannot build a policymaking record by directing an ALJ’s 
attention to appropriate materials and requesting that the ALJ take 
official notice of them.197
In addition, Judge Hardwicke, in his debate with Professors 
Flanagan and Rossi, spoke in support of agency presentation of its 
policies during the contested case hearing.  Judge Hardwicke’s 
remarks on making policy part of the record in the hearing, were, in 
part, as follows:
194 Koch, supra note 167, at 726–27 (footnotes omitted).
195 See id. at 729.
196 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197 See id.
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Agency expertise in support of agency 
decisions is placed upon the table at the hearing qui 
audit decidet.  He who hears decides, is the key 
principle of our life and our law.  To defer the final 
decision back to the agency is, in effect, to give the 
agency a second bite at the apple.  In the central panel 
system and similar systems that we’re familiar with, 
adjudicatorial process is adversarial. . . .  
Consequently, many states have placed a statutory 
limitation upon the agency’s ability to overrule the 
judge except for limited specific reasons. . . .
The truth of the matter is that we are trying to 
prevent the agency head from overturning a decision 
[every time it is one] with which he or she disagrees.  
Neither the agency nor the respondent may be 
agreeable losers; indeed the agency may believe that 
the action would not have been pursued at all without 
justification.  Consequently, when the agency loses, it 
may find reasons, or attempt to find reasons, policy 
reasons or whatever, for reversing.
. . . .
Agency policy, as well as the agency’s expertise, is 
put on the table at the hearing through its staff of 
experts.  Agency policy is part of the law of the case 
and part of the assignment of the judge to apply in a 
given case. . . .
. . . .
I think the policy positions of the agencies 
should be put on the table at the hearing. . . . [I]f you 
have a polluter, for example, that has been a very bad 
apple, the local EPA has had trouble with this person 
for years, and so on the fifth offense, it seeks the 
maximum penalty, a fine of $50,000 a day and 
$50,000 for each offense.  I want the agency to come 
before the administrative law judge, and detail this 
record and recommend the fine and penalty.  It seems 
to me that those policy concerns must be put on the 
table and it is there that they must be dealt with.  Give 
the malfeasor the opportunity to respond and deal with
it in that manner.  I think that’s a far better and proper 
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way to do it than by the in-house agency commission 
head.
. . . .
I distrust a situation where the policy problem is not 
brought up until the hearing and [is then] decided by 
one of the litigants.198
To the contrary of Professor Koch and Judge Hardwicke’s 
views that policy should be made part of the record, Flanagan argues 
that the agency cannot adequately make its policies part of the record 
of the hearing. 199 He argues that this is true because an agency 
cannot always anticipate policy issues to be resolved and their proper 
resolution before trial. 200 The agency may be able to anticipate 
policy issues in repetitive, routine cases but cannot always anticipate 
them in more significant cases.201 Flanagan supports this statement 
with two arguments. 202 First, he argues the policy articulated by 
lower level or mid-level agency staff in making an initial decision 
leading to a dispute underlying a contested case may not be “the 
same as the policy that the [agency] leadership would apply.” 203
Second, he argues that “the facts reviewed by the staff in making the 
[initial] decision” may not be “the same facts that the ALJ will hear 
and determine in the contested case.”204 Flanagan argues the more 
difficult and important the case, the less likely it is the agency will 
fully understand the facts and policy issues and their proper 
resolution. 205 He also argues that low and mid-level agency 
employees make the decisions that eventually lead to contested 
cases.206 He says they decide whether “to grant or deny a license or a 
permit, or take other administrative action,” based on established 
198 Flanagan, Rossi, Hardwicke, & Butler, supra note 120, at 200–01, 
210–11.
199 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 426–27.
200 Id. at 427.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 427–28. 
203 Id. at 427.
204 Id.
205 See id.
206 Id. 
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agency policies and precedent.207 These policies and precedents do 
not necessarily reflect what the leadership would do if the matter 
were to come before them again for reconsideration.208
Stated another way, Flanagan claims that information in 
administrative adjudication increases over time, and agency staff may 
not know all the relevant facts at the time it makes an initial decision 
to grant or deny a license or permit or take other action.209 Flanagan 
notes that, “Obviously, the agency staff receive[s] some information 
from [the opposing party]” before it makes its initial decision.210
But, “this information is [often] indefinite and incomplete. . . .  [T]he 
facts have not been probed and proved in a trial-type proceeding . . . 
.”211 He states that, often, the evidence presented in the trial of the 
case will be “substantially more detailed” than the agency staff 
initially anticipated.212 As long as there is any difference between 
the facts initially presented to the agency and the facts ultimately 
proved to the ALJ during the hearing, there may be uncertainty in 
what applicable agency policies are.213
Flanagan says agency staff may not always know agency 
leadership’s preference on policies applicable to contested case 
adjudication.214 He argues that, “policy is the province of the agency 
leadership.”215 Because of time constraints, agency leadership often 
do not involve themselves in the early stages of litigation.216 Agency 
leadership often do not take an active role in litigation until after the 
litigation has ended because their heavy workload often prevents 
their active involvement in a case until then.217 For these reasons, 
Flanagan argues that the agency needs an opportunity to review ALJ 
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 427–28.
214 See id. at 427.
215 Id. at 428.
216 Id.
217 See id.
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decisions before they become final.218 These arguments do not ring 
true to me.  I presided as an ALJ in complex cases (and sometimes 
not-so-complex cases) for several agencies for over twenty years.  
The agencies for which I heard cases routinely assigned their most 
difficult and important cases to their best attorneys.  These attorneys, 
with whatever formal or informal discovery was needed, made 
certain they understood the facts of the case and the policy issues to 
be resolved before proceeding to trial.  
Further, in all cases I heard, the agency attorneys had 
obviously discussed any unique or unusual issues with agency top-
management.  I always found that agency attorneys knew the policies 
that agency leadership wanted to follow at all stages of every hearing.  
Further, in the more important cases, a high-level institutional agency 
representative was present in the hearing room, sitting at counsel 
table to confer with the agency attorney.  Occasionally, an agency 
attorney might seek a break or continuance to check applicable policy 
with higher-level agency management after some unanticipated 
evidence or arguments.  I freely granted these postponements, and we 
were always able to move forward (usually later the same day).  If 
necessary, I would entertain a motion to reopen the evidence at the 
end of a hearing for the agency attorney or opposing counsel to put 
on additional evidence of agency policy or other relevant matters.  I 
even did this once or twice on my own motion.  Thus, if the agency, 
its adversary, or I realized after the evidence closed that there was a 
gaping hole in the record, we were able to deal with it by reopening 
on a case-by-case basis as justice and sound case management 
required.  Although my experience in hearing complex agency cases 
was mine alone, it was far from unique.  The way I handled these 
cases was largely based on the training I received at the National 
Judicial College, which has trained many thousands of state and 
federal ALJs in the techniques of conducting complex agency 
adjudications.  When I ran an early draft of this paper past the CPDC, 
several of the directors and chief ALJs confirmed that this is the same 
manner in which their ALJs conduct hearings of complex cases and 
issues.
218 See id. at 428–29.
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Flanagan argues, “The fundamental problem with presenting 
policy at the contested case is that it puts the proverbial policy cart 
before the factual horse.”219 He argues:
In the middle of the trial, not only are the facts 
unclear, but also the ALJ, as finder of fact, may not 
accept the testimony of the agency’s experts, or may 
find that the [opposing party’s] views are better 
presented or more persuasive.  An ALJ with final 
authority may adopt his own view of the . . . evidence, 
subject only to limited judicial review.220
The agency does not know whether agency policy will be 
accepted.221 Flanagan states that, “Requiring [agency] policy to be 
fully developed and articulated [in the middle of a hearing] in the 
absence of a fixed set of facts is inconsistent with the general 
jurisprudential approach in our system that rejects the use of advisory 
opinions.”222
Flanagan’s argument concerning advisory opinions takes the 
law out of context.  The law concerning advisory opinions has to do 
with court decisions based on an uncertain or hypothetical set of 
facts.  It has no application to the presentation of evidence by 
litigants in a contested case.  Further, responsible treatment of the 
private litigant demands that the agency not bring or defend actions 
against a private litigant when the agency’s position in the case does 
not correspond to agency policy.  As a matter of sound management 
and to conserve resources, a responsible administrative agency will 
take such steps as are needed to assure there is no breakdown in 
internal communication between policymakers and staff.  It is the 
responsibility of the agency’s chief legal advisor to assure that the 
agency understands what issues it is litigating and why before putting 
the citizen to the expense of an unnecessary hearing.  If the agency’s 
discovery or other investigation of the facts shows that agency staff 
denied a license or filed an enforcement action in conflict with 
219 Id. at 428.
220 Id. (footnote omitted).
221 See id.
222 Id.
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policies of agency top management, the case should be immediately 
dismissed without expending the resources necessary to bring it to 
trial.  
What Flanagan really seems to be objecting to is putting the 
agency through the uncertainties of litigation.  But these uncertainties 
are in the nature of contested adjudications and it would be 
inappropriate to eliminate them if, in fact, we are to continue to 
resolve disputes between an agency and private litigants through 
adjudication.  To the best of my knowledge, no one has contended 
that we should abandon that system.
At least in some central panel states, agency heads have used 
their final decision authority not to correct occasional error but to 
overturn virtually every central panel ALJ decision adverse to the 
agency.  For example, a North Carolina study documented the 
following pattern of decisions by agency heads:223
Calendar year ‘89 ‘90 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘98
Number of 
cases in which 
ALJ ruled 
against agency
52 30 23 38 35 27 53 34 37
Number of 
cases in which 
agency head 
upheld the ALJ 
ruling against 
agency
4 4 3 2 7 5 1 5 6
Percentage of 
cases in which 
agency head 
upheld the ALJ 
ruling against 
agency (%)
8 13 13 5 20 18 2 15 16
The data in this chart was contained in a study by the North 
Carolina General Assembly, Legislative Services Office, Research 
Division, which was presented to the North Carolina Joint Legislative 
223 SHUPING, N.C. GEN. ASSEM. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 114, at 11–50.
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Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee. 224 The data 
strongly indicates that most of the agencies were using their review 
authority to change central panel ALJ findings and conclusions in 
virtually every case that they did not win before the ALJ instead of 
only occasionally overruling ALJ decisions to correct clear error.225
One of the questions I will ask in the survey for Part II of this Article 
is whether other central panels have kept records on the number of 
times the agencies have turned around the central panel ALJ rulings 
against the agencies in comparison to the total number of times the 
central panel ALJs have ruled against the agencies.  I will report this 
information for every jurisdiction for which statistics are available to 
find out whether the North Carolina statistics are typical.  I am also 
hopeful that a data collection system can be established to collect this 
information regularly in the future, in as many central panel 
jurisdictions as possible, for use in the event it is needed for future 
analysis.  This issue is critical and demands further study if the 
administrative adjudication system is to maintain its legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public.
In his unpublished essay, Allen C. Hoberg, Director of the 
North Dakota OAH, states that North Dakota agencies have 
sometimes abused their authority to change the hearing officer’s fact-
findings and conclusions. 226 He says that this has occurred most 
often in cases involving pro se litigants, since the agencies know 
from experience that pro se litigants generally lack the resources and 
understanding of the court review process to appeal their cases to the 
courts when the agencies overturn the hearing officer’s fact-
findings.227
John DiLorenzo (a private attorney who practices before the 
Oregon Central Panel) and former Oregon Central Panel Chief ALJ 
Thomas E. Ewing, collected data from the Oregon Central Panel 
which showed an unusually high incidence of agencies overruling 
ALJ decisions that held against the agency.228 Reviewing the data 
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 Hoberg, supra note 86.
227 Id.
228 See John DiLorenzo, More Independence Needed for ALJs, ADMIN. L.
NEWSL. (Or. State Bar, Admin. Law Section, Tigard, Or.), Fall 2008, at 4, 5.
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collected by Mr. DiLorenzo and Chief ALJ Ewing, Oregon Central 
Panel ALJ David Marcus wrote, 
Based on the data he was provided by the 
OAH, Mr. DiLorenzo raises legitimate concerns about 
the final decisions rendered by agencies.  In that 
sample of 452 cases, ALJ’s [sic] issued only 42 
proposed orders contrary to the agency’s original 
notice of proposed action, and of that number more 
than half were overturned by the agency in its final 
order.  Those numbers clearly raise concerns about 
fairness in the final order process.  As was noted at the 
most recent meeting of the OAH Oversight 
Committee, however, better and broader statistics are 
needed to form a clearer picture of what is actually 
happening in all agencies for which the OAH conducts 
hearings but issues only a proposed order.229
I will similarly be looking for a clearer picture of what is 
going on in the agency review process through better and broader 
statistics of central panel final decisions in the survey information to 
be reported in the second and final part of this paper.
Ignoring the North Carolina General Assembly, Legislative 
Services Office, Research Division statistics and the other materials 
cited above, Professor Flanagan argues that only anecdotal evidence 
supports the claim that agencies sometimes misuse their review 
authority.230 He argues there is also anecdotal evidence that some 
ALJs misuse their authority.231 While I would not be surprised to 
learn that this might be true in some instances, Flanagan bases his 
claim that some ALJs abuse their authority on survey information 
collected by unspecified central panels showing that attorneys and 
other participants in the central panel hearing process rated the 
majority of assigned ALJs as “excellent or good,” but rated other 
ALJs as only “fair, poor, or very poor.” 232 It seems a stretch to 
229 Marcus, supra note 153, at 2.
230 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 421.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 421–22 n.108.
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assume that these rankings imply misuses of authority.  In any 
system, some judges will be more competent than others.  Without 
additional data, I would interpret this survey information as reflecting 
more on the competence of individual ALJs than as documentation 
that they have committed abuses of their authority. 
The central panel ALJs lack the built-in conflict of interest 
that the agency heads have, and this makes central panel judges—at 
least theoretically—fairer and more reliable final decision makers 
than the agency heads. The agency head conflict arises through the 
agency head’s dual role as both head of the litigating agency and 
final decision maker in the adjudications that come before him or her.
Philip Elman, a former member of the Federal Trade 
Commission, wrote persuasively about the need to eliminate this dual 
role.233 He stated, based on his own experience, that this conflict of 
interest exerts a strong influence on agency head decisions and 
argued that this influence often threatens to interfere with a fair 
hearing for the citizen.234 Commissioner Elman stated:
On the basis of my own experience and 
observations, the strongest argument I would make 
against agency [head] adjudication of alleged 
violations of law is that the blending of prosecutorial 
and adjudicative powers in a single tribunal imposes 
intolerable strains on fairness.  The problem of 
avoiding prejudgment, in appearance or in fact, 
constantly hovers over all agency activity and is 
troublesome to agency members in almost every kind 
of action it takes.  It can arise in the most subtle as 
well as obvious forms.
Consider, for example, the so-called test case 
in which the agency issues a complaint in order to 
establish a new legal principle or remedy . . . .  
Agency members frequently take an active part in the
pre-complaint investigative and prosecutorial phases 
of these cases, and the complaint is usually issued 
233 See Philip Elman, A Modest Proposal for Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A. J.
1045 (1970).
234 See id. at 1048.
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with the knowledge that, because of the novelty and 
importance of the issues, it will be fully litigated and 
be back for adjudication on the record.
When the test case does come up on appeal to 
the agency members, while there is no bias or 
prejudgment of guilt in the classic sense, there is an 
inescapable predisposition in favor of the agency 
position as set forth in the complaint.  After all, the 
whole point of starting a test case is to let it go 
forward into the reviewing courts where the issues 
may be finally settled.  To put it bluntly . . . one 
should ask for long odds before betting against 
issuance of a final order.  While a test case may be 
and usually is vigorously contested, the result—at 
least in the agency phase—is likely to be a foregone 
conclusion.  
Indeed, in such a case an agency member may 
vote for an order not so much because he is personally 
convinced that there is a violation of law but because 
he feels . . . that since it is a test case involving a 
doubtful or unsettled question of law, his duty is to 
find against the respondent so that the case may go on 
to the courts for a definitive resolution.  This Catch-22
process may reach full fruition when conscientious 
judges on the reviewing court affirm the agency 
ruling, whatever their own doubts about its merits, 
because they feel obliged to defer to the agency’s 
expert judgment and discretion.  
There are other institutional factors that intrude 
upon fair and impartial agency adjudication.  
Theoretically, when an agency member sits as a judge, 
his freedom to decide is the same as if he were on a 
court.  But the judicial process is designed to insure 
that the judge is both neutral and disinterested and that 
he has no interest other than that of applying the law 
fairly and evenhandedly.  An agency member, on the 
other hand, cannot be unconcerned with whether the 
outcome of the case is to advance or to retard an 
important agency program to which substantial 
resources have been committed.  Even the most 
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conscientious regulator cannot, when he acts as judge, 
ignore the effect which the decision will have on the 
agency’s regulatory policies and goals.  
Moreover, an agency member cannot escape 
the implications of his leadership role in the agency.  
He may fear the effect on staff morale if he votes to 
dismiss the complaint or reject the agency position in 
an important case.235
Professor Flanagan says three significant questions should be 
asked before deciding whether to place final decision authority with 
the central panel ALJ or leave it with the agency.236 These questions 
are:
What are the relative qualifications of the agency and 
ALJ to interpret and apply the law in administrative 
adjudication?  What consequences flow from selecting 
either the agency or the ALJ [as the final decision 
authority]?  Should the final decisionmaker be one 
entity, the agency, or be one or more ALJs in a central 
panel who may have differing perspectives on the law 
and regulations [governing the agency]?237
I submit that there is an additional and much more important 
question, which Professor Flanagan overlooks: Is the ALJ or the 
agency head most likely to provide both the citizen and the agency 
with a fair hearing, both in appearance and in fact?  This question 
should be the primary consideration in allocating final decision 
authority.
235 Id.  Similarly Newton Minow, Chair of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) under President Kennedy, wrote a letter upon his resignation 
recommending that the FCC be stripped of its adjudicative authority.  See Newton 
N. Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the Administrative Process, 15 ADMIN.
L. REV. 146 (1963).  In addition, at his resignation, Louis J. Hector, Chair of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) under President Eisenhower, recommended that 
the CAB be stripped of its adjudicative authority.  See Louis J. Hector, Problems of 
the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960). 
236 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 423.
237 Id.
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In addition, the added expense of a redundant agency review 
of all the evidence supporting a neutral panel ALJ’s recommended 
decision—and the extra time this review consumes—should also 
weigh heavily in deciding whether to allow the ALJ decision to 
become final, subject to court review, or to require a final agency 
review in which the agency may change the outcome of the 
adjudication.  
Written with respect to a very specialized form of 
administrative adjudication in the field of immigration law, Stephen 
H. Legomsky’s article, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: 
Asylum and the Limits to Consistency,238 makes arguments worthy of 
consideration in the wider context of administrative adjudication.  In 
the article, Professor Legomsky addresses the argument that there is a 
need for final agency head review of ALJ decisions to assure 
consistency of decisions as follows:
These arguments are not . . . compelling . . . .  
[C]onsistency, while important . . . does not require 
the agency head’s intrusion into the adjudicative 
process.  When there is a designated [agency in-house 
review mechanism], an en banc decision . . . can yield 
the same consistency as agency head review.  
Congress could even authorize the agency head to 
require the appellate tribunal to go en banc in a 
particular case if there is a concern that an overworked 
adjudicative tribunal would not do so on its own.
The need for agency primacy over policy 
matters can be conceded, but again, agency head 
review is not essential to agency policy primacy.  
Rulemaking and other policy mechanisms are also 
available.  The multiple experts from whom the 
agency head can distill advice and perspectives will be 
just as available in a rulemaking proceeding as they 
are in agency head review of adjudication.  The 
agency head will be just as capable of asserting 
agency policy primacy via rulemaking as he or she 
would be via review of adjudication.  And rulemaking 
238 60 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2007).
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will be just as effective in promoting agency policy 
coherence as review of an adjudicative decision would 
have been—more so, if anything, since the facts of a 
particular case will not constrain the reach of the rule. 
. . . 
While I acknowledge that even adjudicative 
decisions will often require policy judgments . . . the 
basic functions of the adjudicators are, after all, to find 
facts, interpret law, and exercise specific statutory 
discretionary authority.  Even when a case presents an 
important policy question, the agency head can 
supersede the decision by issuing a generally 
applicable regulation if he or she wishes—provided, 
of course, that Congress has delegated the relevant 
rulemaking authority to the agency head.  If Congress 
has not done so, then Congress’s inaction is itself a 
policy decision that requires respect.
. . . .
Moreover, the central rationale [usually given] 
for agency head review—the agency’s political 
accountability—is also precisely what makes agency 
head review affirmatively troublesome.  The agency 
head and any subordinates to whom he or she 
delegates the review function are subject to popular 
and political pressures.  On matters of policy that 
reality is not problematic; consideration of the 
public’s preferences is at home in democratic theory.  
But the essence of the adjudicative function . . . 
generally requires independence, not political 
accountability . . . . 
. . . .
To sum up: There is little need for agency head 
review.  Decisional consistency can be achieved 
through a combination of the administrative appellate 
process, legislative rules (including interim rules when 
necessary), and interpretative rules.  Rulemaking and 
other powers can also preserve agency policy primacy 
and agency policy coherence.  Moreover, agency head 
review poses inherent dangers to the dispensation of 
justice, including especially the substitution of a 
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political outcome for one based on an independent 
adjudicative tribunal’s honest reading of the evidence 
and the law.239
My experience in Texas confirms that the approach of 
insuring consistency through en banc ALJ decisions works in 
practice.  At the mid-point in my career, I was general counsel to the 
Texas Comptroller, the late Bob Bullock.  We had from five to seven 
or eight ALJs on our staff who adjudicated all state tax cases—the 
number of ALJs appointed at any given time varied according to 
agency caseload, backlog requirements, and available appropriations.  
When the ALJs came up with conflicting decisions as to when or if a 
tax was due on a particular type of transaction and under particular 
facts and circumstances, we would have them sit en banc to arrive at 
a single decision, which would be the way the issue would be 
handled in all future cases.  The process worked well, was perceived 
as fair by the attorneys practicing before the Comptroller and the 
ALJs themselves, and led to consistency in decisions.  It also kept 
Comptroller Bullock from personally intervening in the adjudicative 
decision-making process.  There is no reason that central panels 
cannot also achieve consistency through en banc decisions by 
representative panels of judges—if desired by less than all judges in
the larger central panels to avoid the unnecessary delay and expense 
associated with an unwieldy number of judges working on the same 
problem.  It would solve the inconsistency problem that Flanagan is 
concerned about and would be fairer to the citizen than it would be 
for the head of the agency litigating against the citizen to make the 
final decision.  It would also be consistent with maintaining good 
staff morale among the ALJs.
Flanagan states that he has had conversations in which ALJs 
“suggest[ed] that some [state] agencies are . . . resisting legitimate 
direction by the executive or legislative branches” of state 
government and have become “independent power centers.”240 This 
phenomenon, known in the literature as “regulatory capture,” 
describes a situation in which the agency begins to represent the 
239 Id. at 458–59, 461, 462.
240 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425.
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industry it is supposed to regulate rather than the public.241 Flanagan 
makes a tie-in with an article by Professor Jim Rossi:
Professor Jim Rossi . . . noted that state 
governments have special characteristics that 
influence the development of state administrative law 
and central panels.  As compared to the federal 
system, state legislative sessions are shorter, staff 
resources are fewer and special interests more 
prominent.  The state executive branch is weaker and 
has less power to develop [agency] policy than the 
President.  In a jurisdiction with a weak governor [in 
terms of his or her ability to monitor and exercise 
control over agency activities] and a short legislative 
session, an agency with broad jurisdiction or 
important subject matter authority may be insulated 
from legitimate executive or legislative oversight by 
an independent political base.  In this context, a 
central panel with ALJ finality may become a 
legislative tool to counterbalance agency 
independence by transferring final adjudicative 
authority from the agency to the central panel ALJ.242
In the opinion of this paper’s author, transfer of final 
adjudicative authority from the agency to the central panel ALJ may 
serve to restore the balance in favor of the public interest.243
In addition to the reasons for the unique problems leading to 
regulatory capture by industry at the state level noted by Professor 
Rossi, the late Professor Arthur Earl Bonfield attributed these 
problems, in part, to the tendency of state legislatures to place 
241 See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, 
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342–44 (2013).
242 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425 (footnote omitted) (citing 
Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and 
Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN L. REV. 551, 557–59, 568–72 (2001)).
243 See id.
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members of regulated industries on the boards of the agencies that 
regulate them.244 He writes:
[Conflict of interest problems in state
regulatory agencies] are significantly more severe than 
those created on the federal level . . . .  [M]any state 
boards are formally structured to represent particular 
interests [dentists serving on dental boards, realtors on 
real estate boards, morticians on funeral regulatory 
agencies, etc.], a situation that is more unusual in the 
federal administrative process.245
Flanagan does not view ALJ finality as a good way to control 
and restrict regulatory capture.246 He says if other state legislatures 
were to adopt ALJ finality in all agency adjudication, it would be the 
wrong thing to do.247 It would adversely affect all agencies without 
regard to the degree to which individual agencies have or have not 
been properly responsive to executive and legislative leadership.248
Flanagan argues any benefit from weakening the agency by creating 
an alternate power center in the central panel would be 
counterproductive.249 Flanagan does not satisfactorily explain why 
he believes this.250
244 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of Administrative 
Law: A Critical Analysis of the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REV. 95, 128 (1982).
245 Id.
246 See Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425.
247 Id. at 425–26.
248 Id. at 426.
249 See id.
250 One of the early reviewers of this paper has suggested that if final 
decision authority were to be transferred from agencies to central panel judges, 
private industry could then simply capture the central panel judges and achieve 
regulatory capture in that way.  While, in theory, this might be true, it would be 
more difficult for an industry to capture generalist central panel ALJs than it would 
be for industry to capture an agency charged with regulation of only particular 
subject matters of interest to a particular industry.  Chad M. Oldfather explains in 
Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 861 (2012), 
that regulatory capture of specialized agencies and adjudicators is easier than 
regulatory capture of those with a broader jurisdiction.  This is because people 
outside the industry are likely to pay little attention to selection and appointment of 
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Flanagan says, in some jurisdictions, ALJ finality has been 
“proposed as an expedient remedy for litigant frustration with agency 
adjudication.” 251 He argues that it would not help much. 252 He 
argues that litigant frustration is mainly “based on the high agency 
success rate in contested cases.”253 He states that ALJ finality “will 
not significantly affect this rate.”254 In support of this argument, he 
cites Professor Daye’s North Carolina study.255 The study found that 
ALJs “decided in favor of the agency three quarters of the time.”256
Therefore, Flanagan concludes, few cases would have different 
outcomes using ALJ finality. 257 Flanagan argues that, “The real 
reason for litigant frustration is that agencies generally bring actions 
in which they are most likely to prevail.258 Only by changing the 
substantive law would litigants prevail more often in administrative 
adjudication.”259 Flanagan argues that if the law were changed, the 
agencies would know not to bring actions that did not have a chance 
under the new law, so even that would not help.260
To the contrary of Professor Flanagan’s hypothesis that 
litigant dissatisfaction with the administrative hearing process would 
likely be unchanged no matter whether the ALJ or the agency was in 
charge of determining the facts and law so long as the litigant lost the
final decision,261 Christopher B. McNeil surveyed participants and 
officials in isolated fields of regulation in which only the industry has much 
interest.  Id.  This allows those with an interest in the regulated field to exercise 
more influence in the selection of regulatory officials than they could exercise in 
selection of officials with broader jurisdiction.  See id.
251 Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 425–26.  He cites Oregon and 
North Carolina as examples.  Id. at 426.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See id. at 419–20 (citing Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative 
Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2001)); see also id. at 426 (incorporating the earlier discussion 
of Daye’s results into the analysis).
256 See id. at 426.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. 
260 See id.
261 See supra notes 252–260 and accompanying text.
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their counsel in drivers license revocation hearings conducted in New 
York, Florida, and California (where presiding officers in 
administrative hearings to revoke drivers licenses are in-house 
agency employees), and Maryland, Oregon, and Texas (where the 
presiding officers in administrative hearings to revoke drivers 
licenses are central panel ALJs not connected with the drivers license 
agencies). 262 He found that regardless of outcome (most of the 
drivers lost), the drivers’ level of satisfaction with the hearing 
process was significantly higher in those jurisdictions in which the 
presiding officers were perceived to be independent of the drivers 
licensing agency.263
C. The Rossi Articles
Professor Rossi has written two law review articles on central 
panel ALJ final decision authority.264 He argues that ALJ finality 
increases ALJ independence, but that it also decreases agency 
accountability. 265 This decrease results from the agency’s lack of 
opportunity to review and correct “bad” ALJ decisions.266 Rossi says 
the resulting split of executive authority between the agency and ALJ 
raises constitutional concerns.267 However, he concedes this split of 
authority probably does not violate either state or federal 
constitutions. 268 Rossi proposes to restore the proper balance 
between the ALJ and the agency.269 He wants to alter judicial review 
262 See Christopher B. McNeil, Perceptions of Fairness in State 
Administrative Hearings, 92 JUDICATURE 160 (2009).
263 See id. at 162–64; see also Christopher B. McNeil, PERCEPTIONS OF
FAIRNESS IN AGENCY ADJUDICATIONS: APPLYING LIND & TYLER’S THEORIES OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TO STATE EXECUTIVE-BRANCH ADJUDICATIONS (2008).  
This is a more complete version of McNeil’s study.  It was McNeil’s dissertation 
for his degree as Doctor of Philosophy in Judicial Studies at the University of 
Nevada, Reno. 
264 Rossi, Final Orders On Appeal, supra note 3; Rossi, Final, but Often 
Fallible, supra note 3.
265 Rossi, Final, but Often Fallible, supra note 3, at 54–55.
266 See id.
267 See id. at 55, 66.
268 See id. at 64–66.
269 Id. at 66.
                                                             
552 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
standards to give greater weight to agency law and policy positions 
and less weight to the law and policy the ALJ applies to decide the 
case.270
I have read through both Rossi articles several times.  I have 
heard Professor Rossi explain the views he expresses in these articles 
in person.  I have also read Professor Flanagan’s explanation of 
Professor Rossi’s views.271 I must nonetheless confess that I still 
find the methodology Rossi wants the reviewing court to apply 
confusing, particularly insofar as to how it would differ in practice 
from what would occur if the courts just used the same procedure 
reviewing courts customarily now use to review agency decisions.  
Flanagan has commented on Rossi’s views extensively.272 He says 
that “Rossi’s proposal requires the reviewing court to evaluate the 
ALJ’s final decision . . . against the agency’s policy and legal 
framework . . . .”273 He says that “the agency’s policy and legal 
framework . . . includes the predicates for [the agency’s] positions, 
the agency goals, its regulatory values, and their relative weight . . . 
as articulated in the record and agency briefs.”274 The reviewing 
court would apply the substantial evidence or clearly erroneous 
standard of review “to determine whether the ALJ’s policy decision 
was arbitrary and capricious, or clearly erroneous.”275 If the ALJ’s 
policy decision conflicted with the agency’s policies, “the court 
would be free to overturn it in favor of the agency’s position.”276
Flanagan states that, 
Making the agency’s policy the gauge in reviewing the 
ALJ’s policy decisions restores the agency’s role in 
policy development, provides it an incentive to 
carefully articulate the policy in the contested case, and 
ultimately makes the agency accountable for the 
270 Id. at 72–73.
271 See Flanagan, An Update, supra note 3, at 428–30.
272 See id. at 430–32.
273 Id. at 430.
274 Id. 
275 Id.
276 Id.
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decisions made by the ALJ, even though there was no 
formal agency review of the ALJ’s decision.277
Although Flanagan supports Professor Rossi’s effort, he doubts that 
the effort will succeed. 278 Flanagan has two main problems with 
Professor Rossi’s proposal.279
First, it relies on judicial review and only a “few cases . . . 
reach the appellate courts.”280 Flanagan notes that, “the first appeal 
in state administrative law is to a trial court,” which normally does 
not render a written opinion.281 Only a few cases move from the trial 
court to an appellate court, which will render a written opinion.282
Although the cases in which written opinions are rendered “may be 
the more important ones,” there will probably be too few of them to 
provide much guidance.283 Further, “The appellate process . . . is 
particularly slow, and there may be months, if not years,” before the 
appellate courts rule on the issues presented to them.284 Flanagan 
states that, 
At best, changing the standards of review will 
provide an opportunity in a few cases to reverse a 
particularly egregious deviation of policy.  Such cases 
may stand for the general principle that agency policy 
should prevail, but these appellate proclamations will 
be so few that they will be only guideposts, and will 
not serve as an effective means of insuring that ALJs 
do follow the appropriate policy.  The policy 
established by the ALJ will be dominant simply 
because few cases are appealed.  Agency appeals of 
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 See id. 
280 Id.
281 See id.
282 Id. at 430–31.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 431.
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some cases are possible, but it is not practical or cost 
efficient to do so in every appropriate case.285
Second, Flanagan is also concerned that the reviewing court 
will only intervene on the side of the agency if the ALJ’s rulings on 
applicable policy and law “substantially deviate” from the agency’s 
views of applicable policy and law.286 But, what is more likely is 
that policy differences between ALJ and the agency will be 
substantial, but not unreasonable enough to cause a reviewing court 
to reject the ALJ’s decision.287
Flanagan also states that he sees some other significant 
problems in altering standards of judicial review.288 Usually, judicial 
review standards are established by statute instead of common law.289
Flanagan thinks it unlikely that a legislature that established ALJ 
finality and a diminished agency role would turn around and increase 
the agency’s power in adjudication by altering judicial review 
standards in the agency’s favor.290 He thinks the courts would have 
little incentive to alter standards in the agency’s favor.291 Flanagan 
also notes that it is not certain that a change in standards, even if it 
could be accomplished, would be meaningful.292 Although there are 
“subtle distinctions” in the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous 
standards, “it is not clear that they actually produce significant 
differences in the results.”293
Flanagan says, in the end, the change of the standards of 
appellate review would alter the outcome of too few cases to have 
any significant impact.294 The agency would be “dependent on two 
independent actors, the ALJ and the courts,” to enforce its views on 
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See id.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 432.
293 Id.
294 Id.
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law and policy.295 Flanagan argues that the agency could therefore 
“legitimately disavow responsibility for the law” and policy as 
developed in adjudication.296
XI. NEAR CONSENSUS THAT ALJS SHOULD HAVE FINAL DECISION 
AUTHORITY IN SOME CASES
In a surprise ending to his second article, Professor Flanagan, 
who in the remainder of his writings on final decision-making by 
central panel ALJs, has adamantly opposed the concept, writes:
Another option, perhaps the best one, is to 
consider ALJ finality in the context of specific 
programs and specific contested issues. . . .  State 
administrative law is characterized by a vast range of 
contested cases from the most complex multiparty 
environmental matters to simple hunting license 
revocations.  ALJ finality may be appropriate for 
some types of cases.  Recent history shows that some 
states have adopted it for a few programs, and 
agencies have relinquished their review authority for 
some matters.
The factors to be considered in making this 
decision are those that emphasize the strengths of the 
ALJ and at the same time, eliminate or moderate the 
adverse consequences of ALJ finality to the agency.  
The ALJ’s strengths are in providing procedural 
regularity, evaluating factual evidence, resolving 
conflicting evidence, and determining credibility.  The 
agency’s contributions are its subject matter expertise, 
institutional experience with those regulated, and 
authority to make policy.  The best cases for ALJ 
finality are those requiring determination of well 
defined issues of historical fact . . . perhaps involving 
credibility determinations, where the ALJ applies (but 
does not make) established policies to those facts. 
295 Id.
296 Id.
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Driving license cases are one example of this 
class of cases . . . .  These, and comparable cases, are 
primarily fact determinations of recurring enforcement 
scenarios where policy issues have long been 
identified and resolved through regulation and 
precedent.  These cases do not have any significant 
need for agency review because they are unlikely to 
raise or to require the development or modification of 
agency policy.  Agency review provides little 
additional benefits after a hearing before the ALJ and 
may delay any judicial review.297
Michael Asimow has also argued for many years that not all 
ALJ initial decisions should receive agency review.  He has written 
on this subject as follows:
Agency review of initial decisions made by 
administrative judges is costly.  It occupies the time of 
the staff members who process the appeals and of the 
agency heads who must decide whether to affirm 
summarily or to hear arguments and receive briefs in 
the cases.  The consideration of appeals in individual 
cases may distract agency heads from other important 
business, such as making enforcement policy, 
supervising the enforcement staff, considering 
proposed rules or proposed legislation, or engaging in 
economic analysis of the future of the industry that the 
agency is supposed to regulate.  The burden of 
deciding adjudicative appeals may be substantial, 
especially where the agency heads are part-timers.  
Moreover, the agency appeal stage can be 
quite time-consuming; it can delay a final decision by 
months or years, with possible damage either to public 
or private interests.  Thus, it would seem that both the 
effectiveness or regulatory programs and the 
efficiency with which the agency discharges its 
functions could be promoted by diminishing the 
297 Id. at 432–33 (footnotes omitted).
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number of appeals with which the agency heads must 
contend.  Yet most [California] APA agencies and the 
State Personnel Board give some consideration to 
every proposed decision; other agencies make agency-
level review available as a matter of right if either 
party requests it. 
. . . [I]f a case (or a particular class of cases) is 
relatively unimportant (in terms of the regulatory 
program), involves no significant issues of policy or 
discretion, or presents purely factual issues, it might 
be a wiser allocation of agency resources to supply 
only a fair initial hearing without an agency appeal. . . 
.  Appeals in such relatively minor cases are unlikely 
to be successful, so that losing an [in-house agency] 
appeal remedy should not be, and should not seem, 
unfair to litigants; instead, dispensing with agency 
head review will speed up the administrative process, 
avoid the need to pay attorneys to engage in a 
probably fruitless exercise, and allow truly disgruntled 
litigants to get to court more quickly.298
Professor Daniel J. Gifford, in his article, Adjudication in 
Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure,
discussed earlier in this paper, 299 also argues that there are some 
cases, which do not merit agency review, in which the ALJ decision 
should be final subject to an appeal to the courts.300
Further, in a recent article published in a Canadian law 
journal, Professors Michael Asimow and Jeffrey S. Lubbers state 
their support for a federal central hearing agency that would have 
jurisdiction over Social Security issues and, perhaps, other 
administrative hearings involving medical benefit determinations.301
298 Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure 
Act: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1109–10 (1992) 
(footnotes omitted).  
299 See supra notes 138–145 and accompanying text.
300 See Gifford, supra notes 138.
301 See Michael Asimow & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Merits of ‘Merits’ 
Review: A Comparative Look at the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal,
28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 261, 283 n.131 (2010).
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They state that their initial research indicates that the central hearing 
agency decisions should be final except for court review without 
appeal to the agency based on a cost-benefit analysis that they say
seems to show that providing appeals within the agency would not be 
cost efficient.302
As I shall discuss in Part II of this paper, the main issue 
causing the ALJ organizations—NAALJ, the CPDC, and NCALJ—
not to support the 2010 MSAPA was the failure to include an option 
for the legislature to delegate ALJ final decision authority in at least 
some cases, as had been done in a 1997 ABA Model Act for Creation 
of Central Hearing Agencies.  Given what is a growing consensus by 
the academic community that ALJ final decision authority is a 
preferred approach in at least some cases, it is unfortunate that the 
ULC and the ALJ organizations could not get together on this issue.  
Perhaps it is time for the ULC, supporters of the central panel-related 
sections of the 2010 MSAPA, and the ALJ organizations to put the 
acrimony of their earlier debate on this issue behind them and 
reevaluate the issue. 
XII. SUMMARY OF THIS PAPER
This has been Part I of a two-part paper on final decision 
authority for central panel ALJs.  Historically, in-house agency 
employees were stand-ins for agency heads with the function of 
conducting adjudicative hearings for agency heads when the agency 
heads were otherwise occupied.  They wrote proposed decisions 
containing proposed fact-findings, conclusions of law, and their 
recommendations for a final decision.  This historical practice is 
written into the federal APA, but is not binding on the states and can 
be changed by state legislatures.  With the creation of central panels, 
a neutral ALJ to whom final decision authority may be assigned now 
presides in hearings in the central panel states.
Although Professors Flanagan, Rossi, and Moliterno view 
central panel ALJ final decision authority with alarm, they fail to 
make a compelling case as to why—at least with respect to fact-
findings—giving central panel ALJs this authority would not be 
preferable to the agency occupying the dual role of both litigator and 
302 See id. at 283 n.132.
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final decision-maker.  This dual role contains a built-in conflict of 
interest that deprives the citizen of a neutral adjudication.  Moreover, 
there is a growing consensus among both academics and state 
legislatures that final decision authority for ALJs (subject to court 
review) is appropriate in at least some cases.  
This paper has argued, in part, that the law review articles 
opposing ALJ central panel authority rely on flawed arguments.  
Three states—Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina—have 
gone to final decision authority for ALJs on both law and fact in 
virtually all cases.  It is thought that a majority of the other central 
panels in most cases that come before them still follow the traditional 
practice of the ALJ making only recommended fact-findings and 
conclusions of law, with the agency head making the final decision.  
Part II of this paper will compile data from a survey with 
regard to the extent to which central panel states have modified this 
traditional practice and the extent to which the modifications have 
been and may be under consideration in central panel jurisdictions.  
Part II of the paper will also consider the basis for the ALJ 
organization opposition to the 2010 MSAPA in more detail.  It will 
update previously published information on the individual central 
panel jurisdictions.
